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I. Introduction
The 1973 oil supply shock elevated OPEC to world attention and
ensconced it in the general consciousness as a confederacy that is potentially
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
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1. See chart infra Part X.
2. 147 CONG. REC. S7942-01 (daily ed. July 19, 2001); see also Joel Brandon Moore, The
Natural Law Basis of Legal Obligation: International Antitrust and OPEC in Context, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 243, 245, 272 (2003).  
3. See chart infra Part X.
4. Stephen A. Broome, Conflicting Obligations for Oil Exporting Nations? Satisfying
Membership Requirements of Both OPEC and the WTO, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 408, 409
(2006).
5. Kenneth S. Reinker, NOPEC: The No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act of
2004, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 285, 285 (2005).
6. JOINT ECON. COMM., RESEARCH REP. 110-19, EXPECT NO RELIEF FROM OPEC (2008),
available at http://www.house.gov/jec/Research%20Reports/2008/rr110-19.pdf.
7. See Kristen Boon, Coining a New Jurisdiction: The Security Council as Economic
Peacekeeper, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 991, 993-94 (2008) (noting poor economic conditions
linked to many financial, humanitarian and conflict situations); Tim Carey, Cartel Price
Controls vs. Free Trade: A Study of Proposals to Challenge OPEC’s Influence in the Oil
Market Through WTO Dispute Settlement, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 783, 784 (2009); Ganesh
Thapa et al., Soaring Food Prices: A Threat or Opportunity in Asia?, 2 (Brooks World Policy
Inst. Working Paper No. 69,  2009), available at http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/resources/
Working-Papers/bwpi-wp-6909.pdf; Thomas Helbling, Oil and Food Prices Expected to Ease
Only Moderately, IMF SURVEY MAGAZINE, July 1, 2008, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/survey/ so/2008/RES070108A.htm.
8. See Stijn Claessens & M. Ayhan Kose, What Is Recession?, IMF FIN. & DEV. Mar.
2009, at 52-53, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2009/03/basics.htm; Oil
price Down on Recession Fears, BBC, Oct. 16, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/
7673273.htm; Mahmoud Amin El-Gamal & Amy Myers Jaffe, Energy, Financial Contagion,
and the Dollar 12 (James A. Baker III Inst. For Pub. Policy at Rice Univ., Working Paper
2008), available at http://www.rice.edu/nationalmedia/multimedia/contagion.pdf;  Paul Leiby,
antithetical to global energy needs.  From 1986 until mid-1999, prices
generally fluctuated within a $10 to $20 per barrel band, but alarms sounded
when market prices started hovering above $30.1  In July 2001, Senator Arlen
Specter addressed the Senate regarding the need to confront OPEC and urged
President Bush to file an International Court of Justice case against the
organization, on the basis that perceived antitrust violations were a breach of
“general principles of law.”2  Prices dipped initially, but began a precipitous
rise in mid-March 2002.3  In July 2004, Senator Frank Lautenberg released
Busting Up the Cartel: The WTO Case Against OPEC.4  Senators Mike
DeWine and Herb Kohl introduced the No Oil Producing and Exporting
Cartels Act of 2004 (NOPEC).5  Shortly after prices appreciated to $100 per
barrel for the first time in history, Congressman Jim Saxton produced a Joint
Economic Committee Report, Expect No Relief from OPEC.6
The price of oil hit $147 in July 2008, and underscored increasing global
food prices and income inequality, inflation,7 and seemingly recessionary
conditions.8  The OPEC Accountability Act of 2008 was introduced to urge
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Impact of Oil Supply Disruption in the United States and Benefits of Strategic Oil Stocks,
IEA/ASEAN WORKSHOP 3 (Apr. 6, 2004), http://www.iea.org/Textbase/work/2004/cambodia/
bj_Leiby.presentation.pdf.
9. OPEC Accountability Act, S. 2976, 110th Cong. (2008).
10. See Broome, supra, note 4, at 409; Carey, supra note 7, at 783.
11. Gas Price Relief for Consumers Act of 2008, H.R. 6074, 110th Cong. § 102 (2008),
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-6074.
12. See infra notes 404, 412, 417, 460.
13. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss & Nathaniel Stewart, Market Fragmenting Regulation:
Why Gasoline Costs So Much (and Why It’s Going to Cost More), 72 BROOKLYN L. REV. 939,
939-40 (2007); Jeffrey H. Birnbarum, Oil Lobby Reaches Out to Citizens Peeved at the Pump,
WASH. POST, May 9, 2008, at D1.
14. See infra notes 442, 459-60.
15. See infra notes 464-65, 467.
U.S. Trade Representative diplomatic action,9 and Congresspersons called for
initiating WTO dispute settlement measures against OPEC for a “prohibition
or restriction” on trade under Article XI,10 ostensibly contending that supply
collusion led to high prices.  Proposals went further with the Gas Price Relief
for Consumers Act of 2008.  This act, which ultimately was not passed,
sought to extend the Sherman Antitrust Act extraterritorially and grant federal
court jurisdiction over a case in which “any foreign state . . . act[s]
collectively or in combination with any other foreign state . . . to limit the
production or distribution of oil, natural gas, or any other petroleum
product.”11  The bill was sweeping but was premised on narrowly-viewed
facts and logic — price trends may not have been due to collusion or supply
restrictions but due to informational uncertainties.
Despite global fears over low production levels and rising prices, OPEC
maintained oil production at record levels and there was no perceptible
shortage.12  Economists still debate why traders reacted so as to beget
sevenfold market price increases over a six-year period; and, since oil is only
one production ingredient in gasoline, there is no lack of consumer
speculation over whether that should have translated into $4 per gallon fuel
prices.13  One explanation for price trends points to increasing global demand
and risk of shortfall due to perceived production and refining facility
limitations, but a popularly-accepted recent view has transcended efficient
market explanations by positing that trader speculation was causing price
surges.14  This article provides a qualitative analysis of an information-related
geopolitical and military conflict hypothesis raised by many economists and
forecasted by the United Nations.15
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16. See infra notes 211, 214, 407-10.
17.  INDEP. PETROLEUM ASS’N OF AMERICA, Understanding The World Petroleum Market,
IPAA FACT SHEETS, 1 (Dec. 2008), http://www.ipaa.org/issues/factsheets/oil/Understanding
WorldPetro-12-2001.pdf [hereinafter IPAA]; OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin 113-20 (2008),
[hereinafter OPEC, ASB], available at http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20
Bulletin/pdf/ASB2008.pdf.
18. See infra notes 212-13.
19. Robert Bejesky, Politico-International Law, 57 LOY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011)
(manuscript at 4-6, 34-39) [hereinafter Bejesky, Politico]; Robert Bejesky, Weapon Inspections
Lessons Learned: Evidentiary Presumptions and Burdens of Proof, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L &
COM. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 6-29, 37-51, 56-69) [hereinafter Bejesky, WI].
20. See infra Parts V, VI.
21. See supra notes 2, 4-6, 9-11; infra notes 228-30.
Today’s commodity market system involves countries providing oil
demand estimates to the International Energy Agency, OPEC members
making periodic quota supply announcements and adjustments (on forty-three
percent of global supply), and dozens of other countries providing normally
stable production.16  Announcements of supply, demand, shocks, risk, and
uncertainty propagate, and traders buy and sell contracts to set oil spot and
futures market prices on the New York Mercantile Exchange, the London
International Petroleum Exchange, and the Singapore International Monetary
Exchange.17  Consequently, fear of shortage increases price and supply side
fortuity to producer nations and oil companies, to the chagrin of consumer
demand.  During the 2002 to 2008 period of drastic price increases, there was
no dearth of news releases to breed market uncertainty.
The Middle East holds two-thirds of world oil reserves and Iraq, a
founding member of OPEC, possesses somewhere between the largest and
fourth largest reserves.18  The country was placed on the Bush
administration’s radar shortly after President Bush entered office, and by mid-
2002, news chronologies narrated U.N. diplomacy, allegations of threats to
international peace and security, and anticipated attack plans.19  The March
2003 invasion was followed by regular reports of violence that could disrupt
oil production, revelations of White House pre-invasion proposals to
restructure Iraq’s oil industry, and announcements that Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) directives were abruptly implementing unstable market
reforms.20  Concomitantly, but not always related to events in Iraq, some U.S.
officials openly spoke of desires to undermine OPEC.21  Exiles, appointed to
interim governments, announced that reform measures should triple
production, revamp property rights, reduce regulatory controls, and open Iraqi
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss2/1
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22. See infra Part VI.
23. See infra Part VII.
24. See infra notes 351-64.
25. See supra notes 16-17; infra parts III, IV.
26. See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Traditional Petroleum-based Economy: An
“Eventful” Future, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 505, 509-12 (2006); John E. Rhea, Privatization in the
International Petroleum Industry: The Interplay Between Politics, Economics, and Reliance,
33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 609, 613 (2005).
27. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., THE WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 44-148 (Int’l.
Energy Agency ed., 1998); Michael Lynch, ‘Peak Oil’ Is a Waste of Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
25, 2009, at A21.
oil production to foreign investment; all of which might signal a unilateral
intention to bypass OPEC sentiment and later quotas.22
The proposed Oil and Gas Law met fierce resistance and was rejected by
the Iraqi Parliament in late-2007, leaving the country’s energy law obscure.23
With pending alternative bills, national and regional authorities consummated
twenty-year production contracts with multinationals that may conflict with
the Iraqi Constitution and be incompatible with OPEC membership.24  This
geopolitical and law reform chronology is addressed from the perspective of
competing public and private interests to exhibit how information may have
bred commodity trader perceptions of risk and uncertainty, thereby increasing
spot and futures oil prices.
II. Geopolitics and Market Equilibrium
Since oil was discovered, countries have fought to control supply,
companies have shuffled to service markets to become the dominant
multinational corporations, non-democratic rulers have reigned over oil-rich
territory to become aristocratic moguls, and, more recently, global financiers
have traded on fluctuating prices to reap riches.25  Periodic speculations of
exhausting or diminishing supply circulated, but were followed by new oil
discoveries and abundant oil production.  “Diminishing supply” arguments
recently resurged, with some contending that petroleum resources would soon
peak, taper, and exhaust within a century.26  If geological surveys of 2.3
trillion barrels of proven recoverable reserves are accurate and demand
continues unabated,27 exhaustion is inevitable, as oil is not an abiotic or
renewable resource.  However, the speculative timeline is predicated on
pessimistic contingencies and technological dormancy.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
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28. See James A. Duffield et al., Ethanol Policy: Past, Present, and Future, 53 S.D. L. REV.
425-26, 429, 446 (2008) (noting that relatively high oil prices have highlighted some promise
for environmentally-friendly corn ethanol as a fuel blend additive to gasoline, as ethanol
production has grown from 175 million gallons in the early 1980s to 6.5 billion gallons in
2007); Jonathan D. Schneider, Book Review: Crude Awakenings: Global Oil Security and
American Foreign Policy by Steve Yetiv, 26 ENERGY L.J. 211, 214 (2005) (noting that statistics
indicate significant opportunities for improved transportation sector efficiency); Kwon Mee-
yoo, Electric Bus to Debut in Seoul in 2011, KOREA TIMES, Aug. 12, 2009, available at http://
www.koreatimes.co.kr/www.news/nation/2009/09/117_500`9.html (reporting that South Korea
expects to install the infrastructure necessary to operate electric buses in Seoul by 2011 and is
developing plans to construct a network of charging stations and replace all cars, buses, and
taxis with electric or hybrid cars by 2020); Ann Bordetsky et al., Securing America: Solving Our
Oil Dependence Through Innovation, 25 (Natural Res. Def. Council Issue Paper, Feb. 2005),
available at http://www. nrdc.org/air/transportation/oilsecurity/plan.pdf (observing that
technology exists to attain 40 miles per gallon in light vehicles and it will be “feasible and cost
effective” to achieve 55 miles per gallon by 2020); Bradley S. Klapper, Team Unveils Prototype
For Sun-powered Plane, MSNBC.COM (June 26, 2009), http://rss.msnbc.msn.com/id/31569
560/ns/technology_and_science-innovation (reporting that a solar-powered airplane is scheduled
for a non-stop flight around the world in 2012); see also Official Energy Statistics from the U.S.
Government, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/
analysis_publications/oil_market_basics/demand_text.htm (last visited September 29, 2010).
While the transportation sector requires integrating engine weight and fuel in a confined space,
fixed plants have ample area to install alternative energy saving devices.
29. Weaver, supra note 26, at 513 (listing books that challenge “peak oil” thesis).
30. World Petroleum Consumption, Most Recent Annual Estimates, 1980-2008, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2009),  http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/RecentPetroleum
ConsumptionBarrelsperDay.xls [hereinafter EIA, World Petroleum]. 
31. OIL, SMOKE, AND MIRRORS (Ronan Doyle 2006) [hereinafter OSM] (including
interview with British MP Michael Meacher).
32. Population, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL (last
visited Sept. 29, 2010) (noting that the U.S. population is 307 million whereas the global
Across all sectors, particularly transportation, the ability to harness
renewable and use alternative energy sources, and achieve more efficient
energy consumption standards are likely to progress,28 countering “exhausting
supply” arguments.29  Nonetheless, the public should be concerned with how
legislators can promote conservation and how the most efficient technological
innovations will develop in light of intellectual property right laws that grant
monopolies rather than produce collective goods.  Moreover, what scientists
and the private sector are expected to accomplish may not be adequately
incorporated into American foreign policy or international relations.
Global oil consumption grew from 74 to 85 million barrels per day
between 1998 and 2008.30  Some estimate that potential production—which
is fundamental to setting price—might be pushed to 95 million barrels per
day.31  With less than five percent of global population, U.S. consumption is
rather disproportionate.32  Consumption steadily increased to twenty million
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss2/1
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population is 6.7 billion).
33. See EIA, World Petroleum, supra note 30; Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, Reliable,
Affordable, And Environmentally Sound Energy For America’s Future 8-3 (2001) [hereinafter
NEPDG], available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/press/2001/nep/national_energy_
policy.pdf.
34. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2010: Early Release Overview 12
(2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/overview.pdf.
35. Petroleum Navigator: U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/infosheets/crudeproduction.html [hereinafter EIA, Production]
(last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
36. Schneider, supra note 28, at 211.
37. U.S. Imports by Country of Origin, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://tonto.eia.doe.
gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_a.htm; NEPDG, supra note 33, at
8-3.
38. International Energy Statistics: Reserves, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://tonto.eia.
doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=6 [hereinafter EIA, Reserves]
(last visited Sept. 29, 2010) (noting that the US held 21.317 billion barrels in 2009);
International Energy Statistics: US Imports 1984-2008, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://
tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=3&cid=US,&syid=
1984&eyid=2008&unit=TBPD&products=57 (calculating the aggregate daily crude imports for
1984-2008 as 185.787 million barrels and annualized [multiplied by 365] as 67.812 billion). 
39. NEPDG, supra note 33; Terry Macalister et al., A Matter of Life, Death - and Oil,
GUARDIAN, Jan. 23, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jan/23/usa.iraq.
40. Jad Mouawad & Julia Werdigier, Warning on Impact of China and India on Oil
Demand, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/07/business/07cnd-
energy.html.
barrels per day, one-fourth of global supply,33 and the Department of Energy
projects that the increase in demand is apt to remain steady and rise to twenty-
two million barrels by 2030.34  Domestic daily production peaked at 9.6
million barrels in 1970 and has since declined,35 heightening reliance on
imports.  Twelve million barrels per day—sixty percent of
consumption36—are imported, and nearly half comes from OPEC countries.37
Department of Energy statistics maintain that the United States holds less than
one percent of the world’s proven reserves at twenty-one billion barrels, but
imported approximately sixty-eight billion barrels between 1984 and 2008.38
The “Cheney Report” in May 2001 estimated that domestic production will
gradually drop, and demand for imports will increase by six million barrels
per day by 2020.39  Increased demand is by no means limited to the United
States.  Recently, with robust development and over one-third of the global
population, India and China have accounted for seventy percent of the
increase in global demand.40
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41. See Bejesky, Politico, supra note 19, at 16-18.
42. See id. at 13, 20-21, 23-24; supra notes 33-38; infra notes 45, 61.
43. See supra Part II; infra Part VIII.
44. MAMDOUH G. SALAMEH, OVER A BARREL 191 (2004).  Similar themes are common in
documentaries. See, e.g., Conspiracies: Iraq (Sky Television 2006); LIBERTY BOUND (Blue
Moose Films 2004); DVD: Oil Factor: Behind the War on Terror (Free-Will Productions 2005);
The Money Programme: The Last Oil Shock (BBC television broadcast Nov. 8, 2000), available
at http://www.lastoilshock.com/tv.html.
45. OSM, supra note 31.
46. MICHAEL T. KLARE, BLOOD AND OIL: THE DANGERS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
AMERICA’S GROWING DEPENDENCY ON IMPORTED PETROLEUM 1-2 (2004); see infra notes 231-
33.
47. Bejesky, Politico, supra note 19, at 10-13.
If there is a belief that supply may not service demand, then the more
cautious and nationalistic realist view of international relations suggests that
risk of shortfall could influence foreign policy.41  Perhaps heedful self-interest
might translate into flexing military muscle to secure supply, breeding
sentiments of safety with military power, and conceivably creating
perceptions of unethical or unfair strategic advantage from weaker countries.
Cynicism may emerge among developing nations because the United States
consumed most of its domestic reserves to fuel a rapid industrialization that
provided overwhelming economic power and eventual military hegemony.42
Likewise, a history of prosperous development generated an infrastructure
and culture of disproportionate demand that today pressures available
production, ceteris paribus increasing global market price.43
Applied to current circumstances, there are various iterations of the
nationalist interest argument, with one version alleging that the presence of
its security forces in Iraq places the United States in control of the global
economy44 and another asserting that exigency can goad a rational choice
national needs defense mechanism to act, even if the perceived need is not
explicitly espoused as the impetus for action.  Retired French Gen. Pierre-
Marie Gallois, now an energy strategy analyst, expresses that with
“dwindling” reserves, decreasing domestic production, and increasing
consumption projections, it is inconceivable that “the United States, that
dominates the world with its technology, its economy, its military, its space
programs . . . would let itself fall at the mercy of the outside world for an
energy source indispensable to its existence.”45
The Pentagon’s Central Command makes “protect[ing] the global flow of
petroleum” a mission,46 and Bush administration neoconservatives blatantly
affirmed this position with a vision of more involved Middle East “security,”
but both frame security over supply flow as a global collective good.47 In a
book published before drastic price escalations, Professor Steve Yetiv
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss2/1
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48. STEVE A. YETIV, CRUDE AWAKENINGS: GLOBAL OIL SECURITY AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 59 (2005).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 28, at 212 (“incomplete, unsatisfying book, and
possibly a dangerous one”).
51. See Jerry Taylor & Peter Van Doren, The Energy Security Obsession, 6 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 475, 475 (2008); Justin Miller, Book Note, Crude Power: Politics and the Oil
Market, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 266, 267 (2005) (reviewing OYSTEIN NORENG, CRUDE POWER:
POLITICS AND THE OIL MARKET (2002)).
52. NORENG, supra note 51.
53. See chart infra Part X. 
emphasized the altruistic and liberalist Pentagon mission when he wrote that
the role of the military in the twenty-first century is that of “the primary
external protector of global oil supplies . . . The rise of the United States in
this role took place mostly in the past two decades, and it represents an
important anchor of oil stability.”48  He continues, “On a perceptual level,
many more actors now believe . . . that the United States has the direct and
indirect ability to protect oil stability.  That in itself decreases the potential for
market instabilities.”49  Some disagree with Yetiv’s position,50 but nonetheless
many foreign policy advocates, politicians, and scholars openly discuss the
“energy security” preoccupation.51
Another approach might favor global market neutrality and disfavor
annexing military power to private sector prerogatives and global markets.
In a 2002 book, Professor Oystein Noreng emphasized multifaceted economic
and political influences on oil price and predicted that there would not be an
invasion of Iraq because of the risk to global markets.52  This view may
question whether a U.S. military mission as “global oil supply protector” is
compatible with capitalism and whether use of force or threats to use force,
when related to commodities, alleviates or foments market risk.  Because
perceptions of supply disruption breed market uncertainty and actors have
varying views of legitimate action or reaction to threats, what risks hamper
supply, and predictability and stability of the current status quo system, some
traders may view hegemonic military power in conjunction with an aggressive
neoconservative political regime as an impediment to market efficiency.
Although oil prices remained relatively stable and low for nearly twenty
years (excepting a sharp but transient 1991 Gulf War rise) and the U.S.
military had not been fully deployed into combat since the Vietnam War,
prices underwent an approximate sevenfold increase from long-term median
range levels coincident with the transfixion of global attention on Iraq.53
Circumstances unfolding inside Iraq are assuredly complex and involve rights
to natural resources, market reform, public choice and democratization, and
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
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54. See infra Parts VI, VII.
55. See infra Parts VIII, X.
56. UNIV. OF MICH. INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, Iraqi attitudes: Survey Documents Big
Changes, UNIV. OF MICH. NEWS SERV. (June 14, 2006), http://www.ns.umich.edu/news/
index.html?Releases/2006/Jun06/r061406a.
57. See generally this Part; see infra notes 212-14.
58. See ANTHONY ARNOVE, IRAQ, THE LOGIC OF WITHDRAWAL 43-53 (2006); Bejesky,
Politico, supra note 19, at 73-78.
59. See generally JOHN FISHER, CURZON AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST
305 (1999); PETER IRONS, WAR POWERS: HOW THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY HIJACKED THE
CONSTITUTION 54 (2005); MEHRAN KAMRAVA, THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST: A POLITICAL
HISTORY SINCE THE FIRST WORLD WAR 38 (2005)(“[T]he French and British carved up the
Asiatic Ottoman territories in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Mesopotamia (Iraq), Arabia, and
Palestine became British protectorates, while the Syrian and Lebanese protectorates went to the
French”); V.G. KIERNAN, EUROPEAN EMPIRES FROM CONQUEST TO COLLAPSE 1845-1960
(1982), at 200; PHEBE MARR, THE MODERN HISTORY OF IRAQ 22-35 (2004); Robert Cooper, The
New Liberal Imperialism, GUARDIAN, Apr. 7, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/
apr/0701.  Many condemn colonialism for the political and economic remnants.   See, e.g.,
UDAY SIGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH
LIBERAL THOUGHT (1999); ASHIS NANDY, THE ILLEGITIMACY OF NATIONALISM:
RABINDRANATH TAGORE AND THE POLITICS OF SELF (1994); EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND
IMPERIALISM (1993).
60. See NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 2,
300-03 (2004).
societal conflict.54  Market information of instability is relevant to perceptions
of short-term supply, Iraq’s relationship to OPEC, and the long-term viability
of the status quo supply system.55  Before confronting these contemporary
issues, a brief chronology presents the circumstances that formed OPEC to
introduce why contentions exist over what is “fair and reasonable” revenue
to producer nations vis-à-vis consumer market price, why some espouse
security consternation arguments and oppose multinational investment in
Iraq, and whether an ICJ or WTO claim against OPEC is feasible or merited.
III. Historical U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East
A June 2006 University of Michigan Institute for Social Research poll
revealed that seventy-six percent of Iraqis believed that the U.S. invasion was
“to control Iraqi oil,”56 which may be due to the quantity of reserves and
sentiments about historical U.S. and British involvement in key OPEC
countries, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq.57  Occupation of Iraq
against the will of a substantial percentage of Iraqi citizens who all the while
were being apprised that they were liberated has happened before.58  British
colonialism59 established and U.S. administrations60 supported complacent
Middle Eastern governments, and from these relations were granted preferred
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James D. Hamilton, What is an Oil Shock? (June 2000) (NBER Working Paper Series)
(unpublished working paper); see also Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1547 (1999)
(“For the duration of the 1970s, domestic petroleum prices remained below world levels by
government fiat.”); OSM, supra note 31 (Economist Chris Sanders noting: “Without cheap oil,
the American empire would never have come about, certainly not in anything like the form that
we know it.  Cheap oil has been absolutely critical to the construction of the political economy
that is the United States today.  If you remove cheap oil that political economy has to change
profoundly.”).
62. See B.S. MCBETH, BRITISH OIL POLICY, 1919-1939 (1985); David S. Painter, Oil and
World Power, 17 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 159 (2007); Rowena Mason, UK Facing ‘Energy Crunch’
as North Sea Oil and Gas Cash Dries Up, TELEGRAPH, July 8, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.
uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/5779908/UK-facing-energy-crunch-as-North-Sea-
oil-and-gas-cash-dries-up.html; North Sea Oil Flow Starts Off Britain; Long-Awaited Oil Flow
Starts From British Part of North Sea, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1975, at 53.
access to an abundant oil supply and its enormous economic advantage.
Lower production costs and long-term access to cheaper oil permitted more
efficient development, fostered the American economy’s long run dominance,
and forged a multinational oil oligopoly comprised of American and British
companies.61
This exhibition of nationalist self-interest to access or even control foreign
supplies is not surprising to find in the early twentieth-century period of
colonialism, nascent international rules on cooperation, rapid
industrialization, abundant energy need, and heightened dismay over
exhausting domestic reserves (as sophisticated geological reserve estimates
did not exist).  As for Britain’s national interest, it never possessed substantial
domestic oil reserves but obtained supply from colonies and later relied on
offshore production in the North Sea.62  A New York Times article in 1921
seems telling of savvy British financing, uncertainty over domestic
exhaustion, and the American industrial “head start”:
While Great Britain obtains about 80 per cent of the oil used on
her merchant and naval vessels from the United States, at prices
varying from $1.80 to $2.40 a barrel, at the same time, she charges
American ships from $7 to $12 a barrel for oil in the Near East,
Senator McKellar of Tennessee asserted in the Senate today. . . .
‘The oil or petroleum situation . . . is one of such vital importance
to our country at this time that I believe it should command some
attention of the Congress.  According to experts, we own only
about one-sixth of the oil resources of the world, yet we are
producing nearly three-fourths of the world’s supply.  It therefore
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70. ARNOVE, supra note 58, at 45 (citing Eastern Committee Fifth Minutes, Apr. 24, 1918,
British Cabinet Records 27,24); The November 26 Declaration of Principles: Implications for
appears that it is only a question of time before our own resources
will fail, and we will be dependent for our oil supplies on other
nations, that is, unless we take action to protect our own resources,
or to acquire oil fields in other countries.’63
Even before WWI, the British military occupied the Middle East and
viewed management over Iraq and Iran as part of a geopolitical resource
domination strategy to win future wars.64  Britain severed southern Iraq in
1899 to form the colony of Kuwait,65 installed the ruling regime, and
maintained British military occupation.  In December 1934, British Petroleum
and Gulf Oil signed the agreement with the appointed rulers that endowed
these companies with exclusive production rights to Kuwaiti oil.66  Iraq is
twenty-five times larger than Kuwait, but some estimate that Kuwait currently
possesses 102 billion barrels in proven oil reserves to Iraq’s 115 billion
barrels.67
In Iraq, the British installed a monarchy over three provinces: (1) Kurdish
Mosul, (2) Sunni-controlled Baghdad, and (3) Shia-controlled Basra.68  It was
an “Arab façade” government “ruled and administered under British
guidance,”69 “controlled by a native . . . and, as far as possible, an Arab
Staff.”70  The fragile government was beholden to the British military, which
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss2/1
2011] GEOPOLITICS, OIL LAW & COMMODITY MARKETS 205
UN Resolutions on Iraq and for Congressional Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs.,
Human Rights, and Oversight and H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 9-14 (statement
of Colonel Douglas Macgregor, U.S. Army, Retired) (emphasizing “the commercial
arrangements that bring to mind the British Empire’s attempts to extract economic benefit from
a weak Iraqi state after World War I”).
71. CHOMSKY, supra note 65, at 45; see also KAMRAVA, supra note 59, at 38-39.
72. See ARNOVE, supra note 58, at 48-49; Kamil Mahdi, Iraq’s Oil Law: Parsing the Fine
Print, WORLD POL’Y J., Summer 2007, at 11, available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/
pdf/10.1162/wopj.2007.24.2.11 (noting that “European rivalry over access to Iraq’s potential
oil resources predates World War I”). 
73. See STIVERS, supra note 69, at 7; DENIS BABUSIAUX, OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND
PRODUCTION: RESERVES, COSTS, CONTRACTS 17-18 (2004); CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34064, IRAQ: OIL AND GAS LEGISLATION, REVENUE SHARING, AND
U.S. POLICY 1 (2008), [hereinafter BLANCHARD].
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concession to Standard Oil Company of California (SoCal), now Chevron.  See BROWN, supra
at 52.  Production began in May 1939 and the King increased the concession geographical size
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combined.  SAMPSON, supra note 66, at 91.  By 1938, the production interest was called
Arabian-American Oil (Aramco) and included SoCal, the Saudi royal family interests, and
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recently called “the largest and richest consortium in the history of commerce.”  CHALMERS
labeled its presence a “protectorate, a sphere of influence, [and] a buffer
State” rather than “colonialism,”71 even though officials acknowledged keen
interest in what were expected to become some of the world’s most abundant
oil fields.72  As early as 1910, American and British companies partnered
under the name “Turkish Petroleum Company” for early exploration and
production.73  In 1928, the United States and United Kingdom-owned interest
was renamed “Iraq Petroleum Company” (IPC).  IPC managed all oil
production, restricted domestic participation, and prevented new production
without the consortium’s assent.74
The U.S. State Department may have become beholden to oil supply
strategy shortly after WWI.75  American companies were entrenched in Saudi
Arabia by the 1930s.76  After WWII, King Ibn Saud granted the consortium
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Bullitt, Under-Secretary of the Navy, wrote to Roosevelt, “to acquire petroleum reserves outside
our boundaries has become . . . vital interest of the United States.”  SAMPSON, supra note 66,
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and Oversight and H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 9-14 (2007), [hereinafter
Lippman Hearings], (statement of Thomas Lippman, Adjunct Scholar, Middleast Institute),
available at http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/36062.pdf; DREYFUSS, supra note
76, at 70, 90-91, 121; RICHARD P. MITCHELL, THE SOCIETY OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERS 40-42
(1969); SAMPSON, supra note 66, at 99.  In 1975, Vinnell, a private mercenary company, placed
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THE IRON TRIANGLE 61-68 (2003); SAMPSON, supra note 66, at 303; Mideast Dilemma: Is U.S.
Training a Future Foe? U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 24, 1975, at 21.  A curiosity was
expressed whether Vinnel was “supposed to be defending the oilfields from the Americans, or
Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco)77 special access privileges; and
President Roosevelt declared that “defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the
defense of the United States.”78  The State Department called Saudi Arabian
oil a “stupendous source of strategic power and one of the greatest material
prizes in world history” while the British government identified the larger
Middle East as “a vital prize for any power interested in world influence or
domination.”79  Roosevelt expressed to British Ambassador Halifax: “Persian
[Iranian] oil . . . is yours.  We share the oil of Kuwait and Iraq.  As for Saudi
Arabian oil, it’s ours.”80
For sixty years, the American military, through basing rights, placed tens
of thousands of soldiers and private mercenary forces on Saudi soil, provided
enormous aid, and sold billions of dollars in weapons to the monarchy.81  The
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assistance may not have been as necessary for thwarting realistic threats to
sovereignty as it was effectual to securing the ruling regime from internal
revolt.82 The populace remained economically marginalized and
disenfranchised while the expanding royal family lived an eccentric lifestyle,
imported luxuries, built palaces and personal infrastructure, and amassed
wealth exceeding US $1 trillion.83  Congress recently held hearings on the
half-century-long American legacy of supporting the Saudi government while
it was consistently cited for committing human rights abuses.84
In 1953, shortly after Iran nationalized oil reserves in response to
overwhelming popular sentiment, the British MI6 and American CIA
implemented a covert operation that bribed sectors of Iranian society,85
overthrew the democratically-elected government of Prime Minister
Muhammed Mussadiq, and reinstalled the Shah’s kleptocracy which reigned
for the next twenty-five years.86  The Shah reversed the nationalization and
rewarded coup efforts by providing concessions to Anglo-Iranian Oil (40%)-
which was renamed British Petroleum (“BP”) in 1954; Royal Dutch Shell
(14%); and the five American multinationals (40%).87  BP now shared the oil
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as oil.  See Don Greenfield & Jay Todesco, Fundamental Aspects of Oil and Gas Revisited, 42
ALBERTA L. REV. 75, 102-03 (2004).
92. Abrahamian, supra note 87; Stephen E. Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism: The
Constitutionality of “Bending” History in Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 497,
504 n.33 (1987) (criticizing “extraction” of U.S. involvement in Iran from history textbooks);
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2000, at A1; Philip Shenon, Major Overture Toward Iran Expected in Speech by Albright, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2000, at A11.  Military involvement in Iran was extensive; the shah hosted
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IRAQ 764-67 (2004); JOE STORK, MIDDLE EAST OIL AND ENERGY CRISIS 102 (1975); Mahdi,
supra note 72, at 12; Richard Sale, Saddam Key in Early CIA Plot, UPI (Apr. 10, 2003),
that it had exclusively controlled for thirty years.88  The monarchy welcomed
the U.S. military as a security force pursuant to a Status-of-Forces
Agreement.89  In 1976, Amnesty International wrote that the Shah government
had the “highest rate of death penalties in the world,” a “history of torture,”
and “no country in the world has a worse record of human rights than Iran.”90
Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the second rebellion that overthrew
the Shah’s rule, Iran seized the American embassy, leading to the hostage
crisis, and began to expropriate American investments and withdraw assets
from the United States.91  In March 2000, without providing an apology,
Secretary of State Albright acknowledged the “significant role” Washington
played in “orchestrating the overthrow of Iran’s popular Prime Minister
Muhammad Mussadiq” and characterized the CIA covert action coup as “a
setback for Iran’s political development.”92
The British continued to occupy Iraq pursuant to a thirty-year “treaty”
signed in 1930 that purported to protect the colonized country from foreign
invasion, but Iraqis objected.93  After much struggle, and with a substantial
portion of Iraqi military officers revolting against the British military
hierarchy, the monarchy was overthrown in July 1958.94  Perceiving foreign
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assassination attempt); see also Ra’id Juhi al-Saedi, Punishment: Investigative Integration of
the Code of the High Iraqi Criminal Court and the General Principles of the Iraqi Penal Code:
Basic Outcomes, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 265, 265 (2007); David M. Gersh, Note, Poor
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GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 273, 275 (2004).
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oil companies as remnants of colonialism, Prime Minister Abd al-Karim
Qasim’s government responded to popular sentiment by passing Public Law
80 in December 1961 to nationalize oil fields and expropriate IPC’s
interests.95  There has never been an official acknowledgment, but some
scholars and officials contend that there was U.S. covert involvement in
assassination attempts against Qasim96 and that American administrations
were involved in installing favorable regimes for the next three decades.97
Exeter University Economics Professor Kamil Mahdi conjoins this view with
the circumstances surrounding the proposed 2007 Oil and Gas Law when he
writes that “[t]he US, the IMF and their allies are using fear to pursue their
agenda of privatizing and selling off Iraq’s oil resources,” which will
“marginalize Iraq’s oil industry,” and “undermine the nationalization
measures . . . [of] Law Number 80 . . . that recovered most of Iraq’s oil from
a foreign cartel.”98  He adds, “Iraq paid dearly for that courageous move: the
then prime minister, General Qasim, was murdered 13 months later in a
Ba’athist-led coup that was supported by many of those who are part of the
current ruling alliance—the US included.”99
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In June 1961, after the British held Kuwait as a colony for over sixty years
and deemed that the ruling monarchy no longer required “protection,” it was
given independence.100  Many, including political science scholars who
classify Kuwait as only a “partly free” state in datasets,101 are still critical of
the ruling family and its penchant for dismissing unsatisfactory parliamentary
assemblies for long durations.102  The country’s daily affairs are run by
expatriates, who have marginal political rights, have been expelled en masse
for non-conformity to ruling family dictates, and have encountered significant
impediments to attaining citizenship.103  As a consequence of the colony being
severed in 1899, the governing family, dependent on British military
protection,104 enriched itself and supplied British and American oil company
distribution routes.105
IV. Enter OPEC
The colonial oil production system in the Middle East naturally involved
skewed bargaining power that would not be expected to produce anything
akin to a Coase Theorem efficiency contractual result.106  Bilateral relations
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111. HANS VAN HOUTTE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 117 (2d ed. 2002).
112. Jeffrey P. Bialos, Oil Imports and National Security: The Legal and Policy Framework
for Ensuring United States Access to Strategic Resources, 11 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 235, 245 (1989).
113. See Robert Copaken, The Arab Oil Weapon of 1973-74 as a Double-Edged Sword: Its
Implications for Future Energy Security (Sir William Luce Fellowship Paper No. 4, Aug. 2003),
available at http://dro.dur.ac.uk/90/1/Copaken.pdf.
114. See ROBIN LANDIS & MICHAEL KLASS, OPEC: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED
STATES 9-30 (1980); Gawdat Bahgat, Oil Diplomacy: American Policy in the Persian Gulf, 24
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 143, 147 (2000); Meagher, supra note 110, at 276.  
115. Morriss & Stewart, supra note 13, at 1014.
116. See YERGIN, supra note 80, at 616-17.
117. See FRANCISCO PARRA, OIL POLITICS: A MODERN HISTORY OF PETROLEUM 184-85
(2004); Edward Fried, Oil Security: An Economic Phenomenon, in OIL AND AMERICA’S
SECURITY 56-59 (Edward Fried & Nanette Blandin eds., 1988).
118. See Alan S. Miller, Energy Policy From Nixon to Clinton: From Grand Provider to
between multinationals and countries involved variegated preferential terms
of sale, concessions, and tax arrangements; but the resource-endowed nations
aggregated previously divided interest into leverage due to the mutual
reliance that generated revenues.107  Countries possessed the commodity, and
multinationals held the distribution chain to the ultimate consumer.108  The
dispute was over how revenues should be allocated.109  After they obtained
control over most domestic oil reserves in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
and Venezuela, these five countries founded OPEC in 1960110 as a
consultative group to renegotiate contractual relations with111 and counter
multinational ability to restrict global competition.112
As the story goes, within a decade of OPEC’s formation, the organization
garnered sufficient collective power and became emboldened as other
disagreements in the Middle East ignited.113  The early-1970s were turbulent
and some member countries cut production by twenty-five percent,
quadrupling prices.114  In the United States, real gasoline retail prices rose by
over fifty percent between 1972 and 1976,115 and the tightest pinch involved
motorists rationing and waiting in long lines to buy fuel.116  The lingering
economic impact was modest,117 but the government undertook a more
prominent and visible role in national energy policy.118  Competing
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L. REV. 503, 539 (1982).
119. See Morriss & Stewart, supra note 13, at 1020.
120. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation: A Monopsony
Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 13, 43 (1992); Andrew C. Udin, Slaying
Goliath: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to OPEC, 50 AM. U.L. REV.
1321, 1324 (2001).
121. See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553
(C.D. Cal. 1979), aff’d on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1163 (1982).
122. See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982)
(specifying that Sherman Act sections 1 to 7 are applicable if there is a “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce).  Compare Am. Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (holding no extraterritorial application), with United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (allowing extraterritorial application if there
is a direct and intended effect on the U.S.), and H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 9 (1982) (“[W]holly
foreign transaction as well as export transactions are covered by the [FTAIA], but import
transactions are not”).
123. Gas Price Relief for Consumers Act of 2008, H.R. 6074, 110th Cong. § 102 (2008),
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-6074.
124. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see also SAMPSON, supra note
66, at 25-28, 37.
country/multinational supply-side interests were quelled since oil became an
internationally traded commodity, abundantly available119 at the market price,
but questions remained over how much consumers should value that resource.
 A “reasonable” consumer and global market price, given oil’s essential
nature as a macroeconomic production cost, naturally pits
consumption/demand in conflict with producer/supply.
One explanation for recent price surges rode the bandwagon of long-
existing complaints about OPEC’s supply-side dominance.  Some contend
that OPEC’s conduct would constitute a Sherman Antitrust Act criminal
restraint on trade if its actions were taken inside the United States.120  Past
federal court cases against OPEC were unsuccessful.121  However, one can
argue that OPEC’s actions would violate the philosophy of the Sherman Act,
but not the standards as interpreted or amended, even if one liberally
extrapolates extraterritorial application to the global economy.122  Reconciling
this extraterritorial jurisdiction void was the intention motivating introduction
of the Gas Price Relief for Consumers Act of 2008.123  The Sherman Act’s
past applicability is clearer.
The predominantly Rockefeller-owned Standard Oil Trust supply
monopoly was broken up by the Supreme Court in 1911.124  In 1951-52, the
Federal Trade Commission investigated the oligopoly power and price-setting
collusion of the “Seven Sisters,” which were primarily the successful
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of Personal Privilege, May 23, 2007, [hereinafter HOUSE, Privilege] available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=H5639&dbname=
2007_record (quoting Antonia Juhasz, Op-Ed., Whose Oil Is It, Anyway? N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2007, at A19 (“Until about 35 years ago, the world’s oil was largely in the hands of seven
corporations.”)).
126. See SAMPSON, supra note 66, at ix-x, 239, 275, 289.
127. See id. at 265-69.
128. Salvatore Lazzari, Should the Windfall Profits Tax Be Reinstated?, 48 TAX NOTES
1695, 1695 (1990).
129. See Udin, supra note 120, at 1355 (noting OPEC coordinates oil management).
130. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
131. See OPEC Statute, supra note 110, art. 2(B). 
132. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, CASES AND
remnants of the Standard Oil Trust—Exxon, Mobil, SoCal, Texaco, and
Gulf—and British-owned BP and Shell.125  Ironically, only months before the
OPEC oil crisis arose, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee renewed
investigations of the Seven Sisters.126  As the crisis unfolded, the American
multinationals utilized the shifted media spotlight to portray themselves as
consuming-nation public interest heroes with power that was obligatory to
counter OPEC’s price-gouging behavior, while American public opinion polls
at the time reflected uncertainty over whether OPEC or multinationals were
to blame.127  Nonetheless, from a Western perspective, OPEC was eventually
commonly viewed as the market risk.128
Others may observe OPEC’s producer country aggregation benignly, as a
system that provides more market predictability129 and conservation than
either anteceding arrangements or a system in which unassociated interests
compete to supply “as much” oil “as rapidly” as possible.  While the Supreme
Court defined “price-fixing” under the Sherman Act as agreements “formed
for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, . . . or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in . . . commerce,”130 the OPEC Charter
blatantly affirms an intention to influence prices but frames collusion as a
collective good.  The Charter states: “The Organization shall devise ways and
means of ensuring the stabilization of prices . . . with a view to eliminating .
. . fluctuations.”131  Hence, the reasonableness or even legality of OPEC's
supply collusion may hinge upon normative and jurisprudential questions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, whether oil supply management is necessary
and/or fosters global supply stability, and the accepted balance between rights
of sovereignty over natural resources and global free market mechanisms.  By
comparison, before OPEC, the “Seven Sisters . . . dominated world petroleum
trade,” which permitted them to “readily adjust supply and demand, thereby
greatly influencing price.”132  Congressional investigations not only
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MATERIALS 413 (2006) (citing CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, THE CRITICAL LINK:
ENERGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 1980S 126-27 (1982)).
133. See BABUSIAUX, supra note 73, at 18; SAMPSON, supra note 66, at 72-79, 123
(referencing the Achnacarry Agreement of 1928 between Exxon, BP and Shell and fifteen other
prime producers and “Draft Memorandum of Principles” (1934)).
134. See infra notes 429-30, 450-54, 458.
135. See Miller, supra note 118, at 717.
136. See id. at 718.  Compare chart infra Part X.
137. DREYFUSS, supra note 76, at 247-49; Bahgat, supra note 114, at 144; Michael Klare,
For Oil and Empire?  Rethinking War with Iraq, 102 CURRENT HIST. 134 (March 2003);
Michael Klare, The Carter Doctrine Goes Global, PROGRESSIVE, Dec. 2004, at 17, 18.
concluded that the global dominance of the Seven Sisters existed, but also
discovered that the American-British multinational cartel did specifically
consummate agreements to limit supply and set higher prices.133
Referencing history is not intended to retroactively adjudge “national
interest” or “public interest,” or to maintain that an alternative and effective
supply system was viable in the first half of the twentieth century.  The
enormous infrastructure and global supply chain investment into what became
(perhaps even by necessity) a vertically-integrated industry, combined with
geopolitical controversy over natural resource rights and foreign investment
expectations, assuredly formed an imperfect market.  The history of the
colonial system and the shift to OPEC are inescapably important for assessing
Congressional inquiries into OPEC’s purported anticompetitive behavior,
explaining how national security risks were then viewed and may still be
viewed as a “security from disruption” foreign policy, and examining how
supply side interests competed (and then conformed) in light of rent-seeking
behavior that is still eminently pertinent.  Due to recent price surges, record
revenues/profits were posted by both OPEC countries and multinationals.134
Additionally, combining the history to current circumstances evokes renewed
debate over whether current OPEC member infrastructure permits more
supply, the extent that members can or should extend domestic production
capacity with more investment, and whether members should provide
prominent foreign multinational participation inside nationalized industries.
One of the last major events prior to the 1991 Gulf War that involved
securing supply as a foreign policy is germane.  President Carter strongly
emphasized energy policy since the OPEC standoff had recently unfolded,135
but when the Iranian hostage crisis occurred and Iran banned exports to the
United States, crude oil prices surged from $13 to $34 per barrel.136
Consequently, in January 1980, the “Carter Doctrine” announced that “any
attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States” and could
mandate U.S. military action and intervention.137  The Carter Doctrine may
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139. See supra notes 45, 56; see infra notes 218-23.
140. See Bejesky, Politico, supra note 19, at 39-41.  See  supra notes 45, 56; see infra notes
218-23.
141. See e.g., Neil King Jr., Bush Officials Devise a Broad Plan For Free-Market Economy
in Iraq, WALL ST. J. (E. Ed.), May 1, 2003, at A1.
142. See infra Part VI.A.
143. See infra Part VII.
144.  See SUSAN R. FLETCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30692, GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE KYOTO PROTOCOL (2004). 
embody remnants of the colonial-based system, as its promulgation to affront
“outside threats” ironically coincided with an oil price surge.138  The
rhetorical precedent may even be one reason that some suggest the Bush
administration reverted to garnering supply security by brute force.139  Even
if this is an exaggeration, the history surrounding the Doctrine could be
relevant to current commodity market uncertainty.
Bellicose statements about Iraq circulated the media during 2002 and
ostensibly generated varying perceptions about the likelihood of invasion,
uncertainty of conflict, potential supply disruption, OPEC member reactions,
and alternative motives.140  Shortly after the invasion, news reports discussed
activities of White House planning groups that were advising on how Iraq’s
oil industry should be reformed with market principles, deregulation, strong
property rights, and multinational participation to drastically increase
production.141  During occupation, what was publicly articulated, and even
what was proposed in the 2007 Oil and Gas Law, bore semblance to that
advice, which is unsurprising since many exiles generating White House
advisory reports were appointed to top leadership positions in interim
governments.142  Pre-invasion proposals, media announcements during
occupation, potentially the substance of the proposed 2007 Oil and Gas Law,
and the application of Iraq’s constitutional federal structure, all could have
been interpreted as market signals that Iraq’s OPEC membership might be
disregarded, which could unsettle the current supply system.143
V. Oil Industry Reform Planning for Iraq
A. Future of Iraq Project
The political turnover from the Clinton to Bush administration led to
drastic foreign policy shifts.  Clinton favored international cooperation in
reducing oil consumption, as exhibited by signing the Kyoto Protocol with
122 other countries.144  While the Senate rejected Clinton’s desire for U.S.
participation prior to the 1997 meetings, the new Bush administration clearly
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149. See id. at 34-37.
150. See RON SUSKIND, THE PRICE OF LOYALTY: GEORGE BUSH, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND
THE EDUCATION OF PAUL O’NEILL 84-85 (2004); Jane Mayer, The Manipulator, NEW YORKER,
June 7, 2004, at 58; Newsnight: Secret US Plans for Iraq’s Oil (BBC broadcast Mar. 17, 2005)
(explaining that NSC-sponsored meetings were purportedly held in home of Iraqi-born oil
industry consultant Falah Aljibury who contended that he “interviewed potential successors to
Saddam Hussein on behalf of the Bush administration”).
151. See infra notes 218-23.
152. Eric Schmitt & Joel Brinkley, State Dept. Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2003, at 1; see also Susan B. Glasser & Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Reconstruction
Planners Worry, Wait and Reevaluate, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2003, at A1.
153. Reports were declassified during occupation and seemingly emphasized assiduous
administration planning, but revelations could also be perceived as an intention to invade for
reasons other than alleged WMD threats since it was the high-profile UN Security Council
discussions and inspection processes that shaped public perceptions on the reason for invasion.
Public information of this planning emerged shortly after the invasion.  See, e.g., Donald L.
signaled that it would not adhere to Clinton’s assent to the treaty.145  Despite
this, Protocol meetings took place from the perspective of oil commodity
prices being low throughout much of the 1990s.  Prices bottomed in January
1999 at $10 per barrel, coinciding with the Asian financial crisis, but began
an upward trend that reached $30 just prior to the Bush administration
entering office.146  
Unlike the Clinton administration, which was not beleaguered by fear of
foreign oil supply disruption, the Bush administration emphasized energy
security policy.147  Likewise, the Clinton administration did not concern itself
with security threats from Iraq, but George Bush’s inauguration ushered in a
band of “neoconservatives” who had held a five-year, high-profile consensus
that the Iraqi government should be displaced and contended that the existing
regime was a threat to global oil supply.148  It was later revealed that at White
House National Security Council meetings, as early as late-January 2001,
administration officials envisaged displacing the Iraqi government149 and
sought prominent exiles to replace Hussein’s regime.150  It is not clear that
such planning was taking place with “securing oil supply” as a motive for
action, as some have suggested,151 but information does converge, and market
uncertainties might result from that informational overlap.
Many issues merged in early 2002 when select White House, State
Department, CIA, and Pentagon officials, as well as over two hundred Iraqi
exiles, formed the Future of Iraq Project (FIP) to generate advisory reports
for an occupation of Iraq.152  Later declassified documents revealed153 that the
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NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE, (Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/
index.htm. 
155. Schmitt & Brinkley, supra note 152.
156. Hassan, supra note 154 (internal citations ommitted); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OIL &
ENERGY WORKING GROUP, THE FUTURE OF IRAQ PROJECT (2003) (declassified in part on June
22, 2005), [hereinafter STATE DEP’T] available at  http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB198/FOI%20Oil.pdf; Antonia Juhasz, It’s Still All About Oil in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
8, 2006, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/dec/08/opinion/oe-juhasz8.
157. See STATE DEP’T, supra note 156, at 9 (“Iraq’s economy upon liberation will be in need
of billions of dollars of foreign direct investment. . . . The regime change provides the
opportunity to liberate not only the country but also the economy.”).
158. Boon, supra note 7, at 1001-02; David Malone & James Cockayne, The UN Security
Council: 10 Lessons from Iraq on Regulation and Accountability, 2 J. INT’L. L. & INT’L REL.,
Fall 2006, at 1.
159. See S.C. Res. 706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/706 (Aug. 15, 1991); S.C. Res. 712, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/712 (Sept. 19, 1991); S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990) (started
sanctions).
160. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-751, UNITED NATIONS: OBSERVATIONS
ON THE OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAM AND IRAQ’S FOOD SECURITY 2-3 (2004),[hereinafter GAO].
161. See Bathsheba Crocker, Closing Remarks, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 279, 282
(2005); BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 19 (paying five percent of revenues to Kuwait in 2008).
162. David Blair, Opec Considers Adding Iraq to Quota System, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2010
(“Iraq has been exempt from Opec production agreements since . . . 1990.”); Simon Webb, Iraq
project held over thirty meetings from July 2002 to April 2003 and produced
a 1,200-page report containing data, strategies, predictions, and warnings
about what might follow an invasion.154  The seventeen FIP working groups
considered a broad range of economic and political reform measures,155 but
Oil and Energy Working Group (OEWG) proposals were the most
controversial.
The ninety-page State Department document advised that Iraq’s energy
reserves be opened to international investment “as quickly as possible after
the war” to “resolve the economic impoverishment of the country.”156
Political and economic reforms were considered mutually-dependent,
necessitating billions of dollars in foreign investment.157  “Economic
impoverishment of the country” seems significantly due to twelve years of
sanctions that froze Iraq out of the international economy158 and capped the
quantity of oil that Iraq could supply to global markets.159  The UN Oil for
Food program authorized sales of oil and controlled revenues from oil
sales.160 It also funded humanitarian needs, the weapons inspection process,
and war reparations to Kuwait.161
With the UN supply cap, some note that Iraq “exempted” from the OPEC
quota system in the 1990s.162  Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) and
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Strengthens Hand at OPEC with Oil Deals, REUTERS, Dec. 14, 2009 (“OPEC exempted Iraq
in the 1990s”); IPAA, supra note 17, at 2 (accurately explaining that “Iraq’s petroleum
production is defined by the UN sanctions program”).
163. GAO, supra note 160, at 3-4.
164. See OPEC, ASB, supra note 17, at 54 (reporting Iraq’s oil production in thousands of
barrels per day 282.5 in 1991, 526.2 in 1992, 659.5 in 1993, 748.7 in 1994, 736.9 in 1995, and
740.4 in 1996).
165. See id. at 12 (showing Iraq’s export values were significantly lower during the years
1991-1996).
166. GAO, supra note 160, at 3-4; STATE DEP’T, supra note 156, at 4 (reporting that since
December 1996, Iraq has exported oil at a rate of “just under 1.5 million barrels per day”).
167. See supra notes 159-60; see infra notes 178-80, 187-89.
168. See supra notes 159-60; see infra notes 178-80, 187-89.
169. STATE DEP’T, supra note 156, at 1.
170. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).  Another study furnished similar conclusions that attributed
Baghdad’s “mismanagement” of the nationalized oil industry as the cause of the country’s
external debt and poverty.  See Ariel Cohen & Gerald P. O’Driscoll, The Road to Economic
Prosperity for a Post-Saddam Iraq, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Sept. 25, 2002.  The
report begins: “As the Bush Administration and Iraqi opposition groups plan the future of a
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq without its menacing arsenal of weapons of mass destruction
subsequent resolutions prohibited other countries from trading with Iraq
(except for food and medicine), but the Oil for Food Program was established
and allowed Iraq to sell as much as $1 billion in oil every ninety days
(starting in December 1996), resulting in $67 billion in sales from 1997 to
2003.163  Between 1991 and 1996, Iraq’s production was ten to thirty percent
of pre-sanction levels164 because only domestic needs were being serviced.165
After the Oil for Food Program was established, production significantly
increased, but revenue caps placed permitted exports below Iraq’s OPEC
quotas.166  The combined consequence of UN sanctions and Baghdad not
having control over revenues is that reinvestment into industry infrastructure,
which could have increased production, was limited both by capital and the
uncertainty of if and when exports could be increased.167  Externally-imposed
ultimatums restricted economic development and oil revenues, while other
countries, including some Security Council members, sought to develop
economic relations with Iraq.168
Likely casting uncertainty into OPEC’s production quota system is the
OEWG claim that “Iraq’s oil output is a mere one-third to one-ninth of what
it could be if the oil industry was restructured and competitively operated.
War and sanctions are not the reason that Iraq’s oil industry has chronically
failed to achieve its potential output.”169  The OEWG report juxtaposes
current production with estimated potential production to “illustrate the
magnitude of the losses imposed on Iraq and its people through the chronic
inefficiency of its oil industry.”170  It states that Iraq’s Gross Domestic Product
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(WMD), economic issues loom large.”  Id. at 1.  It further asserted that failure to increase oil
production was due to “diverting at least $6.6 billion -- primarily in revenues from smuggled
oil and kickbacks -- to his program to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
platforms for their delivery.”  Id. at 3.  It seems that this $6.6 billion expenditure as a cause for
oil industry stagnation was mistaken since all post-invasion inspections concluded that no
evidence of WMD programs was discovered.
171. See STATE DEP’T, supra note 156, at 3.
172. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, TABLE 11.5: WORLD CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, 1960-2009,
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/txt/ptb1105.html. 
173. See STATE DEP’T, supra note 156, at 3.
174. Id. at 5. 
175. Id. at 3-5 (noting several steps to strip authority from the Oil Ministry and enacting laws
for “de-monopolisation” so that investment would be “opened to private companies”).  See
generally Cohen & O’Driscoll, supra note 170 (proffering that privatization, elevated property
right institutions, and open market liberalization would relieve the country’s economic ills and
advising that the Bush Administration, with Western “expatriate” assistance, “should help Iraqi
opposition leaders to develop an economic reform package for their country”).
176. STATE DEP’T, supra note 156, at 5-6.
(GDP) “peaked at $74.9 billion in 1990, collapsed to $10 billion in 1991, and
stood at $27.8 billion by 2001.”171  GDP trends trace the period of (1) no
sanctions, (2) sanctions, and (3) Oil for Food Program permitted sales.172
Presuming equivalent economic, political, and social circumstances, the
OEWG explains that GDP of the other ten OPEC member states grew by
forty-three percent over the same period and suggests that Iraq’s economy
should have equivalently prospered.173
Armed with explanations that isolate externally-imposed sales restrictions
as exogenous to production efficiency and a premise that there is a “massive
trend to privatization. . .of national oil companies throughout the world”
because nationally-owned companies “no longer serve the best interests of
their countries,”174 the report considers three restructuring variables—
“decentralizing” production, resource ownership, and foreign investment.
The OEWG proposes that decentralization should weaken the Iraqi National
Oil Company (INOC), strengthen property right protections, and reduce
government regulatory controls.175  Decentralization might break the INOC
into three or four state-owned and/or privatized, commercially-operated,
entities and engage in partnerships, joint ventures, service agreements, equity
sharing arrangements, or Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) with
international oil companies.176
B. Foreign Oil Companies
The OEWG recognized that its proposals for foreign investment were
effectively “Iraq’s oilfield development programme announced in 1997,”
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[hereinafter EIA, Iraq], available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Iraq/pdf.pdf; Mahdi, supra
note 72, at 13; Iraqi Oil Deals Under Saddam, REUTERS, Oct. 24, 2003; Foreign Suitors for
Iraqi Oilfield Contracts, JUDICIAL WATCH (Mar. 5, 2001), http://www.judicialwatch.org/Iraq
OilFrgnSuitors.pdf [hereinafter Foreign Suitors].
181. S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
182. Exec. Order No. 13303, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,931 (May 23, 2003), available at http://
albeit without breaking up the INOC.177  Additionally, the OEWG is aware
that the program had already consummated “production sharing contracts,
service contracts and joint ventures” with French, Russian, and Chinese
companies (and reportedly with Italian, Spanish, Indian, Turkish, Vietnamese,
Algerian, Indonesian, and other oil companies).178  One could contend that
these foreign interests may have been a reason for pressure to end sanctions
during the mid-1990s.179  There was a 1997 China National Petroleum
Corporation contract to develop the al-Ahdab and Amara oil fields, a $3.7
billion contract with a consortium of Russian oil companies to develop the
West Qurna field, a negotiated $4 billion contract with French interests to
develop the Majnoon field, and an assortment of other contracts that some
argued should have remained valid.180  Instead, two months after the invasion,
Security Council Resolution 1483 was adopted and incorporated language
applicable to preexisting contracts: 
Noting the relevance of the establishment of an internationally
recognized, representative government of Iraq and the desirability
of prompt completion of the restructuring of Iraq’s debt . . . [The
Security Council] further decides that, until December 31, 2007,
unless the Council decides otherwise, petroleum, petroleum
products, and natural gas originating in Iraq shall be immune, until
title passes to the initial purchaser from legal proceedings against
them and not be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment,
or execution.181
Identified as the “Occupying Authority” under Resolution 1483, the United
States and Britain took administrative control over oil processing,
distribution, and revenues from the U.N. Oil for Food Program, and that
authority was ostensibly perceived as commissioning domestic
“implementing” legislation.  On the same day that Resolution 1483 was
adopted, President Bush issued Executive Order 13303.182  Commentators
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187. See EIA, Iraq, supra note 180; Carol Kaysen et al., WAR WITH IRAQ: COSTS,
CONSEQUENCES, AND ALTERNATIVES 72 (2002); Emad Mekay, Challenges 2004-2005: US to
Take Bigger Bite of Iraq’s Economic Pie, IPS (Dec. 23, 2004), http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?
idnews=26798. 
noted that the Order opened a potential constitutional and jurisdictional
complication since it prevented legal redress, could nullify court judgments
related to previous oil field contracts, and potentially immunize any range of
other civil claims.183  Professor Claire Kelly explains that Order 13303
“arguably challenges our notions of separation of powers, due process and
access to the courts . . . [and] appears to extend perpetual judicial immunity
to oil companies doing business in Iraq by precluding a class of claims against
private companies without providing an alternative forum for those claims.”184
Remedial claims may not have been filed if the Resolution and Executive
Order caused a perception of futility.  Meanwhile, the policy for the Order,
even contained in the title—“Protecting the Iraqi Development Fund”—meant
that the CPA would administer the oil industry and revenues and protect
resources for “development.”  Preexisting contract rights were not per se
protected,185 even though foreign investment was considered essential for
development.186
Instead, economic advisors were dispatched to Iraq to advise on how
countries such as France, Russia, and China would be compensated for $40
billion in contracts signed with the former government.187  British and
American companies were not involved in agreements, but the United States
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WASH. POST (May 23, 2003), http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/03/sp_world_
goodman052303.htm. 
and the United Kingdom were instead staunchly insisting that sanctions
remain, limiting the quantity of oil exports to international markets, and
busily quarantining Iraq with controversial no-fly zones.188  After the
invasion, Washington prevented companies from countries such as Russia,
Germany and France from engaging in many commercial endeavors, which
may have been discriminatory treatment under the WTO and U.S.
procurement regulations.189  Furthermore, misgivings may emerge because
international law forbids occupying powers from exploiting the natural
resources of an occupied territory.190
C. Oil Industry Market Signals
During 2002, diplomacy, likelihood of conflict, and Pentagon invasion
plans pervaded the media.191  Exiles, such as Ahmed Chalabi, publicly stated
as early as September 2002 that American oil companies would be favored for
oil field investments.192  Media reports relayed that there were prospects for
future foreign commercial activity in Iraq, that foreign oil companies might
have investment opportunities, that White House officials had been meeting
with opposition leaders to form an interim government and with American
and British oil company executives about a possible role in restoring the oil
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pre-invasion news articles discussing US multinational involvement in Iraqi oil fields); Dan
Morgan & David B. Ottaway, In Iraqi War Scenario, Oil Is Key Issue: US Drillers Eye Huge
Petroleum Pool, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2002, at A01;  Bejesky, Politico, supra note 19, at 57-
58 (noting Bush administration statements about oil revenues funding occupation); Michael
Moran & Alex Johnson, Oil After Saddam: All Bets Are In, MSNBC, (Nov. 7, 2002),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3071521/; US Delays Planned Meeting on Exploiting Iraq’s Oil
and Gas Reserves, ALEXANDER’S GAS & OIL CONNECTIONS, (Nov. 27, 2002), http://www.
gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntn24886.htm. 
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195. See U.S. HOUSE OF REP. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT REFORM - MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL
INVESTIGATION DIV., HALLIBURTON'S PERFORMANCE UNDER THE RESTORE IRAQI OIL 2
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199.  U.S. HOUSE OF REP. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT REFORM - MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL
INVESTIGATION DIV., supra note 195, at 2.
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sector, and that oil revenues were apt to fund an occupational government.193
An MSNBC headline read: “Oil after Saddam: All bets are in – A great but
quiet rush is on for a stake in Iraq’s huge reserves.”194  Announcements might
impact stock prices and influence commodity trading if the possibility of
invasion appeared likely and it was perceived that certain companies could
have an undue advantage in Iraq's energy sector.
Congressional investigations into Halliburton’s overcharging revealed that
the Pentagon, through the Army Corp of Engineers, awarded Halliburton
subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) a no-bid sole source contract for
repairing the oil infrastructure.195  The “Restore Oil” contract was quietly
awarded eleven days before the invasion;196 the head auditor called it the
“most blatant and improper contract abuse I have witnessed during the course
of my professional career.”197  Soon after, the FBI initiated an investigation.198
A Congressional report states: “The Bush Administration started planning for
the take-over of Iraq’s oil fields nearly a year before the invasion of Iraq.”199
In addition to the already discussed OEWG planning, the President formed
an Energy Infrastructure Planning Group and Halliburton was awarded a $1.9
million contract in fall 2002 to furnish proposals “for U.S. occupation of the
Iraqi oil fields.”200  Planning may have derived from early National Security
Council (NSC) meetings and accompanying documents, which included a
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available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32370.pdf; 149 CONG. REC. H9586-87 (Oct. 16,
2003); Tiefer, supra note 189, at 42.
Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield Contracts NSC memo dated March 5, 2001,
that itemized which countries possessed contracts or interests in attaining
contracts and maps of Iraqi oil fields.201  As early as January 2001,
government action quietly stirred over the possible overthrow of an OPEC
member government.202
As the Security Council “WMD threat” diplomatic sequence unfolded, the
possibility of invasion led to indications that there might be a role for foreign
oil companies to increase production within an OPEC country possessing a
nationalized industry.203  American oil companies had an early interest in
developments inside Iraq, and even provided what was called “pro bono”
training and assistance on industry practices.204  The appointed Ministry of Oil
leadership initiated negotiations with foreign companies205 and implemented
an interim modified buy-back contract system whereby international oil
companies financed exploration and development expenses in exchange for
a guaranteed fee and reimbursed costs.206  Multinationals could have also
benefitted from related occupational reform policies.  Financial “dependence”
may have encroached upon CPA control over Iraqi revenues, fiscal policy that
“dollarized” the economy,207 Ex-Im Bank loans and guarantees for export and
reconstruction,208 no-bid reconstruction contracts favoring U.S.
multinationals, procurement policies that often excluded companies from
“non-coalition” countries,209 and the presence of a U.S. military occupation.
New debt and bonds, effectively collateralized by future oil revenues, were
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issued with longer-term repayment schedules210 and reconstruction efforts
were dominated by American companies charging U.S. costs of
reconstruction on a developing country.  How this dependent relationship
may have unfolded several years later is discussed infra in section “VII. 2007
Oil and Gas Bill.”
D. Oil Politics
Claims that there were alternative reasons for the Iraq invasion—other than
WMD and “threats to peace”—became common both before and after the
invasion.  For effecting commodity market stability, whether cynicism is
merited is inconsequential.  The question is whether propagating rumors of
“conquest,” financial interests, and “peak oil” bred market risk and
uncertainty as to the status quo.  Several types of public information may be
relevant.
Forty-four countries possess ninety-nine percent of the world’s oil
resources.211  Iraq likely possesses the second or third largest oil reserves, and
the Middle East holds two-thirds of global oil reserves.212  While
unsubstantiated, Iraqi leaders even announced that “unconfirmed or potential
reserves” may yield sixty-five percent more oil (214 billion barrels),213
rivaling that of Saudi Arabia.  British Petroleum executives predicted that by
2020, one-third of all oil traded would come from Iraq, Iran and Saudi
Arabia.214
After the invasion, media stories emerged of American soldiers seizing
principal oil fields and labeling them “Forward Operating Base Exxon” and
“Forward Operating Base Shell.”215  Some returning soldiers claimed that they
were told that the invasion was not about liberation, democracy, or security
threats, but about securing oil resources.216  Iraqi officials alleged that soldiers
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Oil?, GUARDIAN, June 5, 2003); Bill Moyers Journal: Moyers on Big Oil, supra note 217.
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oil, (2) Hussein’s presence caused a threat to regional supply disruption, or (3) oil revenues
could somehow fund weapon acquisitions outside of the UN Oil for Food program.
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seized oil fields, guarded the Ministry of Oil building while adjacent
ministries were destroyed, and prevented Ministry employees from returning
to work.217
Some government officials also expressed that oil was a factor driving the
invasion and occupation.218  Representative Dennis Kucinich contended that
oil was “the strongest incentive” for the invasion.219  Undersecretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz was asked to clarify the rationale for targeting Iraq,
but not North Korea, for allegedly possessing WMD, since North Korea had
apparently “restarted” its own nuclear projects during that time.  He stated:
“Let’s look at it simply.  The most important difference between North Korea
and Iraq is that, economically, we just had no choice in Iraq.  The country
swims on a sea of oil.”220  Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
remarked that “the Iraq war was largely about oil” because Hussein’s
“behavior” posed a threat to regional oil supplies.221  Congressman Jim
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227. Colin Powell, Secretary of State Powell Discusses President’s Trip to Africa, WHITE
HOUSE (July 10, 2003), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/07/
20030710-5.html; Barlett & Steele, supra note 153.
McDermott stated on the floor of the House of Representatives: “From the
beginning of the Iraq invasion, more moderate voices, especially overseas,
questioned whether the ulterior motive behind toppling Saddam Hussein was
a grab for Iraqi oil. . . . Gaining access to the oil wealth of Iraq has had oil
industries salivating for years.”222  Robert Ebel, a former CIA oil analyst,
remarked: “The thought was, ‘Why are you going into Iraq?  It’s about oil,
isn’t it?’  And my response was, ‘No, it’s about getting rid of Saddam
Hussein.  The morning after, it’s about oil.’”223
White House officials denied such charges.  In October 2002, White House
Press Secretary Ari Fleischer was asked whether oil concerns impelled
bellicose rhetoric and affirmed: “[it] is not a factor.  This is about preserving
the peace and saving the lives of Americans.”224  UN diplomacy intensified,
and later that month, Fleischer remarked that diplomatic confrontation only
sought to attain Iraq’s compliance with Security Council resolutions: “The
President has said repeatedly that America’s policy is regime change.”225
Fleisher further noted that, “[t]he only interest the United States has in the
region is furthering the cause of peace and stability . . . [and] not his country’s
ability to generate oil.”226  Three months after the invasion, Secretary of State
Powell remarked: “We have not taken one drop of Iraqi oil for U.S. purposes,
or for coalition purposes.  Quite the contrary. . . . It costs a great deal of
money to prosecute this war.  But the oil . . . belongs to the Iraqi people; it is
their wealth, it will be used for their benefit.  So we did not do it for oil.”227
Related developments might suggest otherwise.  High-profile
Congressional demands for political and legal action to confront OPEC might
breed cynicism when combined with other information.  The London
Guardian explained that Pentagon “hawks have long argued that U.S. control
of Iraq’s oil would help deliver a second objective.  That is the destruction of
Opec, the oil producers’ cartel, which they argue is ‘evil’ [and] . . .
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incompatible with American interests.”228  White House and State Department
documents emphasized the desire for U.S. companies to attain long-term and
stable production rights in oil fields and noted that such involvement could
undermine OPEC.229  Two months after the invasion, and before there was
any semblance of a representative government, a Washington Post article
discussed Iraq’s future with OPEC in an article entitled, “US Advisor Says
Iraq May Break with OPEC.”230
Some espoused that the military was providing a global collective good by
“securing” oil resources.  Army General John Abizaid, head of operations in
Iraq, stated that the United States may want to maintain a long-term military
presence in Iraq to protect moderates against the region’s extremists and to
protect the flow of oil.231  In polls conducted at about the same time, Iraqis
perceived this intention more cynically as an attempt “to control Iraqi oil.”232
In 2008, Abizaid explained that “American military power keeps the flow of
oil going . . . for our friends, and our allies, and the producing nations” and
“our enemies are trying to disrupt that movement.”233  That is one perception.
Commodity traders, however, are global, and what may be viewed as
“securing,” “protecting,” or “stabilizing” to some could be viewed as the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss2/1
2011] GEOPOLITICS, OIL LAW & COMMODITY MARKETS 229
234. See infra Part X.
235. See generally supra Parts II-III.
236. STATE DEP’T, supra note 156, at 5. 
237. See id. at 28 (“Iraq’s enormous reserves of oil and gas are the endowment, patrimony,
and birthright of the Iraqi people.  This endowment is managed for the Iraqi people by the
state.”); Hassan, supra note 154 (noting the report’s finding that privatization may be
challenging because “nationalism in Iraqi oil industry is very strong”).
238. Juhasz, supra note 156. 
239. See Barlett & Steele, supra note 153 (“Iraqi exiles – and the Bush Administration –
want to see the Iraqi oil industry privatized in order to attract foreign investment.”); Robert
Collier, Foreigners, Exiles Appointed to Help Run Iraqi Oil Ministry, S.F. CHRON., May 4,
2003, at A9; Hoyos, supra note 192; David Ivanovich, U.S. Plans For Oil Industry After
Saddam, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 24, 2003, at A01; Stanley A. Weiss, A Blessing and a Curse: Iraq
Needs Help Kicking the Oil Addiction, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2003, http://www.nytimes.
com/2003/06/13/opinion/13iht-edweiss_ed3_.html (“Washington dangles the promise of billions
cause of “chaos,” “disruption,” and “uncertainty” to others.  Sevenfold higher
prices did not precede the invasion.234  Instability and escalating prices
followed—information about the invasion might have cognitively merged
with highly-emotive allegations from various venues about “conquest,” “peak
oil,” national needs, and historical foreign policy toward the Middle East.235
VI. Occupation Announcements and Economics
A. Appointing Exiles and Early Public Announcements
The controversy over whether Iraq’s nationalized industry should be
opened to foreign investment severs use of military force from securing
foreign resources, but may still generate questions of whether rational choice
is supplanted by compulsion.  Advocacy for foreign investment clasps tightly
to the dominant discourse of neoliberalism as the most effective means for
development, but this premise assuredly polarizes the Iraqi public and OPEC
members.  The OEWG favored privatization, contending there is a “massive
trend to privatization” because nationalized oil companies “no longer serve
the best interest of their countries,”236 but conceded that privatization might
lead to nationalism.237  Instead, it recommended “assist[ing] Iraqi leaders to
reorganize the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise” and
“encourag[ing] investment in Iraq’s oil sector by the international community
and by international energy companies.”238  OEWG members working for the
Bush White House prescribed what “leaders” should do in the event of regime
change and many of those same advisors were appointed to government
positions.
Within two weeks of the invasion, exiles began to announce that the
nationalized industry should be opened to foreign investment.239  A Wall
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in untapped petrodollars before the eyes of desperate Iraqis.”); BP Maps Out Iraq Strategy,
CNN, Apr. 9, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/BUSINESS/04/09/bp.reut/.
240. Neil King Jr., Bush Officials Draft a Broad Plan For Free-Market Economy in Iraq,
WALL ST. J., May 1, 2003, at A1.
241. See Jill Carroll, Why a Black Market For Gasoline Vexes Iraq, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Apr. 20, 2005, at World 06; Eric Pfanner, Iraq Seen as Crucial Factor in OPEC
Move to Cut Output, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at W1; HOUSE, Privilege, supra note 125
(referencing quotes in several periodicals, noting Uloum’s OEWG position was to “[open] to
international oil companies as quickly as possible after the war. . .[and] attract investment of
oil and gas resources,” and documenting later announcements of intentions to privatize the
industry after becoming Oil Minister).
242. Nicolas Pelham, Iraqi Minister Sees Oil Privatization Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2003.
243. Pfanner, supra note 241.
244. Mahdi, supra note 72, at 14 n.9.
245. Id.
246. See REP. OF IRAQ COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, OIL & ENERGY COMMITTEE, FINAL DRAFT
IRAQ OIL AND GAS LAW (Feb. 15, 2007), art. 12(B), available at http://web.krg.org/
uploads/documents/Draft%20Iraq%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Law%20English__2007_03_
09_h17m2s47.pdf [hereinafter IOG LAW] (proposed law affirming INOC authority over existing
Street Journal article opened by stating:  “The Bush administration has
drafted sweeping plans to remake Iraq’s economy in the U.S. image. . . . [T]he
U.S. is calling for the privatization of state-owned industries such as parts of
the oil sector, forming a stock market complete with electronic trading and
fundamental tax reform.”240  OEWG member Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum was
appointed to head the Ministry of Oil and immediately announced the need
for privatization and foreign investment.241  A New York Times article,
significantly based on an interview with al-Uloum, stated, “Iraq is preparing
plans for the privatization of its giant oil sector, but a decision will not be
taken until after elections.”242  Three weeks later, the title of another New York
Times article read, “Iraq Is Seen as Crucial Factor in OPEC Move to Cut
Output,” and the article quoted al-Uloum’s forecast that production would
reach six million barrels per day by the end of the decade.243
In June 2004, appointed Prime Minister Iyad Allawi selected Barham
Saleh, a man described as lacking economics training but holding neoliberal
convictions, to head the Supreme Council for Oil Policy.244  The Council
issued proposals to “divorce government from running the oil industry and to
commercialize its operations,” open unexploited reserves to private
ownership, gradually privatize resources, and foster rapid production
growth.245  In September, Allawi recommended that Production Sharing
Agreements be applied to all fields other than those already in production,
which meant opening up sixty-three of Iraq’s eighty known oil fields and any
newly discovered fields to foreign investment and participation.246  He further
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fields bill but opening others to foreign investment); see also HOUSE, Privilege, supra note 125
(referencing Allawi’s “guidelines to the Supreme Council for Oil Policy”); ARNOVE, supra note
58, at 75; Carola Hoyos, Baghdad Re-entry to Market ‘Could Have Big Impact,’ FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2003 (Yergin contending that control over Iraq will be of great significance because
of “the scale of the resources” and potential “realignment” of oil exporting interests); Muriel
Mirak-Weissbach, Cheney’s Oil Law for Iraq is Neocolonial Theft, GLOBAL RESEARCH, Oct.
8, 2007.
247. REP. OF IRAQ, IRAQI STRATEGIC REV. BOARD, MINISTRY OF PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 2005-2007, at 15, June 30,
2005, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IRFFI/Resources/Iraq-NDS-July14-
FINALFINAL[1].pdf.
248. See Jefferson Morley, Washington’s Waning Influence in Iraq, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,
2005; Juhasz, supra note 156; Mekay, supra note 187.
249. See Minister Goes in Iraq Oil Crisis, BBC, Dec. 30, 2005; see also Lionel Beehner,
Backgrounder: Iraq and Oil: Revenue-Sharing Among Regions, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, Dec. 29, 2005, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9482/iraq_and_oil.html.
250. See, e.g., Neela Banerjee, A Retired Shell Executive Seen as Likely Head of Production,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at B12; David Teather, American to Oversee Iraqi Oil Industry,
GUARDIAN, Apr. 26, 2003; see also HOUSE, Privilege, supra note 125 (referencing multinational
executive appointees); Mahdi, supra note 72, at 15; Palast, supra note 229; Renner, supra note
217.
251. STATE DEP’T, supra note 156, at 4.
252. See supra notes 244-50; see infra notes 253-56.
contended that production would more than triple to six to eight million
barrels per day within five years.247  At a National Press Club Conference,
appointed Iraqi Finance Minister Mahdi announced plans for a new petroleum
law and predicted that opportunities would be “very promising to the
American investors and to American enterprise, certainly to oil companies.”248
In early 2005, Ahmed Chalabi, who already had a history of making similar
statements, was appointed chair of the Iraqi Energy Council and became the
interim Oil Minister in December.249  Also, many former American and
British multinational executives were appointed to Ministry of Oil advisory
positions and to CPA-Ministry of Oil liaison positions,250 perhaps giving an
impression that policies and opportunities would favor particular interests.
OEWG advisors contended that “drawing upon international experience, from
the oil industry or other sectors, . . . might calm fears of those opposing de-
monopolization” reform.251
Accommodating optimistic estimates from reform-oriented appointees, the
White House provided an “instructional” approach to shape premises favoring
reform.252  A U.S. State Department/Bearing Point Study selected seven
country models—Kuwait, Iran, Venezuela, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi
Arabia, and Azerbaijan—categorized them by varying degrees of government
involvement in the oil industry, and presented indicators of prudent operation
to foster R&D, effective business practices, and “good governance and the
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253. BEARING POINT & USAID, OPTIONS FOR DEVELOPING A LONG TERM SUSTAINABLE IRAQI
OIL INDUSTRY 7-8, 32, Dec. 19, 2003, available at http://www.platformlondon.org/carbonweb/
documents/Bearing_Point_Iraq_oil.pdf. 
254. Id. at 1-2. 
255. See id. at 7 (“[M]ore and more countries are coming to realize that these non-core
obligations have imposed costs upon the NOC [national oil sector] and may have diluted the
incentive to maximize profits, hindering the entity’s ability to raise external capital, to compete
at international standards, and to maintain or expand the country’s oil production capacity,
which should be its main function.”).
256. See id. at 1, 10-13. 
257. William Lazonick & Mary O'Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology
for Corporate Governance, 29(1) ECON. & SOC. 13 (2000).
258. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of
Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights and Responsibilities,
rule of law.”253  It also presented foreign participation modes to accommodate
a time frame for “rehabilitating” and “developing” the oil sector.254  The
report produced from the study does not overtly favor a particular reform
model but itemizes justifications for decentralizing power and control from
the central government to achieve an industry market structure and attract
foreign investors with lower risk and guaranteed return.255  It emphasizes the
commercial-like environment in the selected countries and recognizes that
dominant companies in those countries are all state-owned.256  However, the
report does not explore public interest consequences of state-ownership, or
mention the impact of OPEC production quotas on industry operations, and
only discusses foreign investment vehicles in abstract and non-quantitative
terms.
B. Rent-Seeking as a Potential Cause of Conflict and Market Instability
Privatization and related reform measures that reduce government
involvement in the oil industry can impact public interest and foreign
investors.  Proposals to weaken government control over extraction and to
permit foreign investment are apt to breed uncertainty among OPEC
members.  This uncertainty may then create trader uneasiness about future
global supply and commodity pricing.  This section discusses key economic
impacts of proposed Iraqi oil law reform measures and how they may breed
anxiety.  The proposed federal law that sought to implement reforms by
creating new institutions in Iraq is discussed in the next section.
In a privatized world that lacks substantial government restrictions over
commodity or product supply, the efficient market presumption is that
competitive entities will make production decisions to maximize profits and
shareholder value.257  Without supply collusion, an industry’s infrastructure
capacity would be maximized based on demand and price expectations.258
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23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 451, 484-86 (2008) (referencing dominance of Adam Smith's "invisible
hand" as a basis of neoliberal theory and explaining that it should not be regarded as ironclad).
259. See LéON WALDRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS (1874) (Allen & Unwin, eds.
1954).
260. See supra notes 2, 4-6, 9-11; see infra notes 417-25.  Since OPEC meeting
announcements typically reference quota decisions based on whether the market is adequately
supplied, an alternative view is that the quota itself is a perception rather than an actual
limitation that sets an artificially high price.
261. ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID, & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE REGULATION
490 (5th ed. 2003).  The assumption of preferring lower prices emphasizes short- and mid-run
public interest as a function of measurable consumer utility.  Alternatively, a longer term
speculative perspective is that higher oil prices now might stimulate alternative energy
innovations and thereby lower energy prices in the future.
262. See supra notes 7-8, 61.
263. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 108 YALE L.J. 1619, 1633-34 (1999); Richard A. Oppel Jr., Cheney Tax Plan From
’86 Would Have Raised Gas Prices, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2004, at A20 (Senator Cheney
remarking that Americans had to rid themselves “of the fiction that low oil prices are somehow
good for the United States”); SUVs and the Politics of the Energy Bill, NPR (June 18, 2007),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11164724 (noting luxury SUV current-
year tax write off advocacy as an economic stimulus seems to exhibit indifference).  U.S.
automakers advocated high oil consumption patterns during the 1990s by favoring SUVs,
opposed electric vehicles, and rejected higher efficiency standards.  See KEITH BRADSHER,
HIGH AND MIGHTY: SUVS--THE WORLD’S MOST DANGEROUS VEHICLES AND HOW THEY GOT
THAT WAY 388-96 (2002); Don Mayer, Corporate Citizenship and Trustworthy Capitalism:
Cocreating a More Peaceful Planet, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 237, 265 (2007).
Product supply would abound, profit margins would decrease, and a lower
equilibrium price would exist for consumers.259  Ergo, if OPEC’s existence
and oil production quota decisions do set artificially high prices,260 then
competing (rather than cooperating) interests would be apt to supply more oil
and global consumers would be appeased with lower prices.261
Higher prices decrease GDP, increase food and other commodity prices,
and lower expendable income.262  The undesirability of these conditions is
espoused by those who favor weakening OPEC.  However, the price that
maximizes consumer utility is arguably inversely correlated with the rent-
seeking interests of both producer countries and multinationals, and may even
be met by relative indifference from some industry and political interests.263
When supply system principles are applied to drastic reform initiatives,
such as those pushing privatization and foreign participation in Iraq, interests
become multifaceted and not entirely self-evident.  One might assume that
multinationals would prefer privatization if it permits enhanced operational
control and lowers risk by granting property rights.  But if privatization places
oil production decisions within the prerogative of the private sector (with no
OPEC quotas), and Iraq either sets a precedent for privatization or diminishes
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264. See Newsnight, supra note 150 (emphasizing that American oil company interest in Iraq
is long-term access and distribution rights, but multinationals may oppose privatization if
OPEC’s existence correlates with higher prices).  Oil companies sometimes advocate policy
shifts toward countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya away from confrontation to normal
diplomatic relations.  See Cyrus Bina, The American Tragedy: The Quagmire of War, Rhetoric
of Oil, and the Conundrum of Hegemony, J. IRANIAN RES. & ANALYSIS, Nov. 2004, at 7,
available at http://www.urpe.org/ec/Iran/bina_oil_2.pdf.  Easing tensions would likely reduce
risk and potentially open opportunities, but perceptions of “turbulence” may raise uncertainty
and increase prices.
265. See supra notes 36-37; infra notes 268, 448-54.
266. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS AND CLUB GOODS (1986) (expressing a broader theorization of the traditional public
goods free rider problem with reference to "uncompensated interdependencies"); The Cowardly
Giants, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 17, 2007, http://www.newsweek.com/2007/11/17/the-cowardly-
giants.html.
267. JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER
60 (2004); MARJORIE KELLY, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF CAPIRAL: DETHRONING THE CORPORATE
ARISTOCRACY 19-28 (2001); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 17.
268. See generally Fernanando Barrera-Rey, The Effects of Vertical Integration on Oil
Company Performance, OXFORD INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES (Oct. 1995), http://www.
oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM21.pdf; Wes Kusner et al., Oil Industry: Global Value Chains,
DUKE UNIV., http://www.duke.edu/web/soc142/team9/GVC.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2010)
(“Although the overall production of oil is driven by global demand, the value chain in
producer-driven and many of the companies are vertically integrated and have control over
every level in the chain.”); SAMPSON, supra note 66, at 58.
OPEC power, then future oil prices and multinational revenues could be
lower.264  U.S. producers supply forty percent of domestic oil consumption
from U.S. reserves and participate in foreign production,265 which means that
multinationals generate a higher percentage of revenues at the market price
by free riding on any potential impact that OPEC may have on setting a
higher global market price.266  If multinationals act to increase shareholder
value by maximizing risk-adjusted profit expectations,267 then their optimum
rational preference would likely be to favor reform that guarantees long-term
exclusive production rights, short of privatization, with a reasonable national
level cap on production.  Multinationals dominate the global shipping and
vertical distribution chain, add value during refining (e.g. converting crude
oil into petroleum), and franchise gas stations that sell fuel to consumers, but
they still procure a percentage of oil from many foreign sources at a cost
closer to the market price than to the cost of extraction.268  Naturally, profit
margins have the potential to be higher if multinationals participate in
production and replace a higher percentage of oil acquired at market price
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269. Robert Grosse & Juan Yanes, Why Oil Will Cost $5 per Barrel in 2010, 25 FLETCHER
F. WORLD AFF. 59, 62 n.4 (2001).
270. Mamdouh G. Salameh, The Oil ‘Price Rise’ Factor in the Iraq War: A Macroeconomic
Assessment 1 (U.S. Assn. For Energy Econ. Working Paper Series 08-008, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1140333. 
271. See, e.g., Banerjee, supra note 193; Helmut Merklein, Who Needs Big Oil in Iraq: The
Case for Going it Alone, MIDDLE EAST ECON. SURVEY (Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.menafn.com/
qn_print.asp?StoryID=38863&subl=true. 
272. See Saeed Shah, Scramble for Iraq’s Oil Begins as Troops Start to Pull Out,
INDEPENDENT, Feb. 23, 2007, at Business 58; Tariq Shafiq, Iraq’s Draft Petroleum Law: An
Independent Perspective, MIDDLE EAST ECON. SURVEY (Feb. 19, 2007), http://www.mees.
com/postedarticles/oped/v50n08-5OD01.htm; Heather Stewart, Iraq Poised to Hand Control
of Oil Fields to Foreign Firms, OBSERVER, Feb. 25, 2007, at Business 1; Hassan Jumah Awwad
al-Asadi, Head of the Fed’n of Oil Unions, Speech on Oil Law: History Will Not Forgive Those
Who Play Recklessly With Our Wealth (Feb. 6, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.basraoilunion.org/2007/02/history-will-not-forgive-those-who-play.html)
(expressing adamant opposition and noted that technical training, higher technology, and
foreign capital were unnecessary).
cost with oil acquired at something closer to extraction cost, which may be as
low as $1 to $2 in the Middle East.269
The reverse side of the rent-seeking shift by which multinationals can
replace a higher percentage of market price cost with extraction cost is the
effect on Iraqi public interest.  Participation via either Production Sharing
Agreements or concessions redirects revenues from the public to the private
producer, and the public instead receives allocated percentages of that market
price revenue.  Foreign producers hold long-term and exclusive production
rights while Iraqis retain the remainder interest in an exhaustible resource and
receive various revenue sharing and taxation percentages depending on the
terms of the foreign participation vehicle.  Meanwhile, the typical
nationalized OPEC member exports at the market price and revenues remain
with the domestic producer.  World Bank consultant Mamdouh Salameh
contends that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was “undoubtedly about oil” and
emphasizes that the optimistic estimates of 330 billion barrels of proven and
probable oil reserves at a high $130 per barrel price would be valued at $42.9
trillion—over three times the annual U.S. GDP.270  Others explain that Iraq
produced oil without external assistance and investment for over three
decades,271 and that trading domestic control for new technology and expertise
brought by foreign multinationals is not imperative, given the ease of
accessing Iraq’s reserves (by comparison to off-shore operations, such as
those in the North Sea) and low exploration costs with already-mapped giant
oil fields.272  This potential future revenue loss, however, is the trade-off for
receiving a present large capital infusion from risk-bearing investments.
Estimates for necessary oil field investments in Iraq have ranged from $1
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273. See, e.g., Merklein, supra note 271; Sam Vaknin, Analysis: Is it All About Oil?, UPI,
Mar. 20, 2003, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/2003/03/20/Analysis-Is-it-all-about-oil-
II/UPI-24021048173854.  There may also be perception differences about foreign investment
between global commodity traders, multinationals, and financiers who understand investment
opportunities, and the media’s portrayal of OPEC or Iraqi perceptions.  Consider this opening
paragraph in a more recent article: “Iraq is poised to open its coveted oil fields to foreign
companies this week for the first time in nearly four decades, a politically risky move in a
country eager to shake off the stigma of occupation.”  Ernesto Londoño & K.I. Ibrahim, Iraq
Set to Seek Foreign Oil Bids: Critics Say Contracts Will Benefit Giant Firms, Hurt Government
Politically, WASH. POST, June 28, 2009 (emphasis added); see also Carola Hoyos, Call for Opec
to Let in Oil Majors to Boost Output: Total Chief Believes Expertise of Industry Leaders Can
Help to End Shortages, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2004, at 1 (noting that OPEC members “must open
their doors to international oil companies to ensure that supply meets growing demand”).
274. Merklein, supra note 271.  By comparison, Saudi Arabia produces 11 million bbl/d and
Iran produces 4.2 million bbl/d, countries that are over four times and three times the
geographic size as Iraq respectively.  See Country Analysis Briefs: Saudi Arabia, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. 2,  http://www.eia.doe.gov.emeu/cabs/Saudi_Arabia/pdf.pdf (last updated Nov.
2009); Country Analysis Briefs: Iran, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 3, http://www.eia.doe.gov/
emeu/cabs/Iran/pdf.pdf (last updated Jan. 2010).
275. See generally Parts VI(A)(B), VII(A).
276. See supra notes 156, 175, 192-94, 237-53; see infra notes 292-97.
277. See Kanan Makiya, Op-Ed., Present at the Disintegration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005,
at WK13; BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at summary, 1.
billion to $38 billion, depending on production targets and time periods for
development.273
These economic results may be what is presently on the cusp of unfolding
in Iraq.  The rhetoric that heightened industry efficiency was required to
surmount extraordinary production goals drove the perception of need for
large-scale foreign capital infusion.  Initial goals of at least three million
barrels per day or more were espoused,274 which were modest, within OPEC’s
quota system, and did not invoke controversy.  What did invoke controversy
were production estimates that significantly exceeded modest increases, the
parties advocating production criterion, and plans for how goals would be
achieved.275  The OEWG report, the State Department/Bearing Point Study,
exile statements, the Bush administration, and interested party advice all
presumed that foreign investment was required to substantially increase
production with greater efficiency in the national public interest to support
economic development and democratization.276
Undeniably, oil revenues are a public imperative since they previously
accounted for more than ninety percent of government revenue,277 but because
of the structure of the global oil market, it is not clear that producing more or
achieving greater efficiency would be the public’s rational choice.  If Iraq
doubled production, but new laws and institutions primarily shifted revenues
to the private sector of foreign and/or nouveau riche domestic oil companies,
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278. See Juhasz, supra note 156; Vernon L. Smith, The Iraqi People's Fund, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 22, 2003, at A14 (“A central issue in Iraq . . . remains whether the people control
government through voting and taxes or the government controls the people through a
monopoly of natural resources.”).
279. Alternatively, one can postulate scenarios where there is desire to maximize production
and perhaps even indifference over whether foreign participation is utilized to achieve higher
production.  For example, as a contraposition to “peak oil,” renewable energy resources might
gradually lower global demand, drop price, and leave a future Iraq with a retrospective
sentiment of regret that it did not supply a maximum quantity at a somewhat lower price.
Anticipated value of remaining reserves fifty years forward are endogenous to some
oligopolistic behavior and forecasting models.  See James Griffin & Weiwen Xiong, The
Incentive to Cheat: An Empirical Analysis of OPEC, 40 J.L. & ECON. 289, 293-99 (1997).
Interim winners of substantially-increased production are global consumers with lower price
and Iraqis with potentially higher total revenues (but lower reserves with marginal residual
value).  Losers are other oil endowed nations with less revenue due to lower price at potentially
lower supply quantities.  Technological development may make such a market structure
possible, but from the perspective of present conditions, such a scenario requires layering
numerous contingencies to register a rational choice.  There are more immediate conditions that
influence perceptions.
280. This premise has been justified on multiple theoretical grounds for decades.  See, e.g.,
M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(1965) (discussing public choice and interest group advocacy); JOHN VICTORS & GEORGE
YARROW, PRIVITIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1988) (noting that some industry case
studies refute privatization/greater efficiency assumption); O.E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS
OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM (1964)
(employing agency theory); A.A. Alchian & H. Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and
Economic Organizations, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (applying property rights theory); H.
Averch & L.L. Johnson, Behaviour of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON.
REV. 1052 (1962) (discussing regulatory control theory); K.L. Dewenter & P.H. Malatesta,
State-Owned and Privately Owned Firms: An Empirical Analysis of Profitability, Leverage, and
Labor Intensity, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 320, 320-34 (2001) (utilizing empirical confirmation).
Recent studies have even found that nationally-owned oil companies are less efficient than
privately owned companies.  See Nadejda Makarova Victor, On Measuring the Performance
of National Oil Companies (NOCs) 21 (Standford Univ. Program on Energy & Sustainable
Dev., Working Paper No. 64, 2007), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/21984/WP64,_
Nadja_Victor,_NOC_Statistics_20070926.pdf; Christian Wolf, Does Ownership Matter? The
Performance and Efficiency of State Oil vs. Private Oil (1987-2006) (Univ. Of Cambridge-
Judge Bus. Sch., Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139025.
and those entities recouped most of the value from additional production, the
real value to the public may actually decrease.278  Resources could be depleted
twice as rapidly with only marginal increased public benefit from additional
production.279  Moreover, while it may not be controversial that the private
sector, and particularly multinationals, can be more efficient in production,280
achieving efficiency improvements of 10%, 25%, or even 50% seems
inconsequential if public/private rent-seeking shifts from market revenues on
additional production can approximate 100% to 500%, particularly with
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281. See supra notes 195-202.
282. See Edward Epstein, Firm Linked to Cheney Wins Oil-Field Contract: Hussein May
Destroy Facilities in Event of War, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 8, 2003, at A12; Memorandum from
Minority Staff to the Member of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Feb.
15, 2007), available at http://www.reform.democrats.house.gov/documents/20070215105317-
73621.pdf.
283. See Andrew E. Kramer, Deals With Iraq Are Set to Bring Oil Giants Back, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 2008, at A1; Ghazi Sabir-Ali, Let Iraqis Rebuild Their Own Country, GUARDIAN, Aug.
1, 2003, Guardian Leader 23 (former Iraqi oil executive contending that within fourteen days
of the 1991 Gulf War oil was pumping at 75% of pre-war capacity and also explaining that four
months into the present invasion, Iraq was importing oil for the first time in sixty years and
paying excessive prices).
284. See Kramer, supra note 283, at A1.
sustained higher market prices.  With multifarious clashing domestic and
international interests, it is not surprising that it would take four years to
achieve the first tangible manifestation of federal-level Iraqi energy law
reform.
VII. Iraq’s 2007 Oil and Gas Bill
A. Political Will and Regulatory Authority
If a country chooses to legitimately exploit its natural resources, then there
presumably must be an acceptable balance between public and private rights.
On the one hand, increasing short-term supply of a resource, such as oil,
could be accomplished by increasing production of existing facilities within
months.  Increasing production on these facilities will involve preexisting
conditions, rights, obligations, and norms.  However, the drilling, completion,
production, infrastructure construction, and transport of oil from new
facilities to already-existing or new pipelines can take much longer.
Moreover, tapping new fields will invoke new property and contract rights,
which are apt to gain legitimacy by garnering political will and ideally having
a sanctioning legislative structure.  For Iraq, since production from
preexisting oil fields was not meeting new target levels, there was much
pressure to adopt a new federal energy law structure.  This pressure resulted
in the 2007 oil and gas law draft bill, which was not enacted into law, but has
nonetheless resulted in PSAs with foreign investors pursuant to its terms.
The "Restore Oil" contract was awarded prior to the invasion and obligated
Halliburton to optimize production on existing fields.281  By 2007, Halliburton
had charged $2.4 billion to repair the existing infrastructure,282 but 2008
production was only about 2.5 million barrels per day, which was lower than
pre-invasion levels.283  The company blamed security problems,284 but low
production numbers might not have been precise due to the lack of metering
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15, 2010) (noting that the Board repeatedly asked CPA to install metering equipment). 
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corruption); James Glanz, Billions in Oil Missing in Iraq, U.S. Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May
12, 2007, at A1; Philip Shishkin, Losing Fuel: Pipeline Thefts Cripple Iraqi Oil Production,
WALL ST. J., May 25, 2007, at A1; BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 20-21.
287. See generally infra Part X.
288. See supra notes 156-57, 192, 239-52.
289. See Bejesky, Politico, supra note 19, at 74-77; infra notes 292-304.
290. See chart infra Part X.
291. See infra notes 293-97.
292. Tina Susman, Iraqis Resist U.S. Pressure to Enact Oil Law, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2007,
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/may/13/world/fg-oil13;  Iraqi: Letter of Intent, Memorandum
of Economic and Financial Policies, INT’L MONETARY FUND 10 (Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.
imf.org/external/np/loi/2005/irq/120605.pdf; BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 25.
equipment to accurately track crude oil extraction.285  The U.S. Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) estimated that hundreds of thousands of
barrels may have been unaccounted for each day due to theft and
smuggling.286
For several years, the media relayed political leaders' optimistic
announcements of drastic production increases and promises of legislative
reform, but news releases also depicted potential disruption to oil production
and public hostility to market-based institutional structures, foreign
investment, and even occupation.287  The succession of exiles, appointed
leaders, and pro-occupation officials needed no goading to publicly promise
extensive and expeditious market reform and a prominent role for
multinationals.288  Others maintained that economic reform measures were
externally-dictated, which may not have boded well for expectations of
stability since the ex post facto “liberation” justification for invasion
presumed “democratic will” would determine natural resource rights and
transactions.289
Highly publicized legislative initiatives embodied the greatest likelihood
of adoption in early 2007 and controversy coincided with oil market prices
escalating to new highs.290  Later-elected Iraqi officials, who would ostensibly
have a greater shared interest with the populace than did earlier CPA-
appointed and exile-run governments, were urged by the United States, oil
companies, and other foreign interests to enact new laws.291  That prodding
even involved the IMF preconditioning loan assistance on promises to enact
a new petroleum law by the end of 2006.292
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293. BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 2.
294. See id. at 6.
295. See Edward Wong & Damien Cave, Iraq Cabinet Approves Draft Oil Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/26/world/africa/26iht-iraq.4729390.html.
296. See Mahdi, supra note 72, at 14; Mahdi, supra note 98.
297. See 455 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) (2007) 1500, available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070124/debtext/70124-0016.htm#07012465000725
(MP Michael Meacher remarking: “[A] new draft law is about to be pushed through the
fledgling Iraqi Parliament by the United States that will set up contracts to allow major US and
British oil companies to extract substantial parts of the oil profits for a period of up to 30 years.
No other middle eastern producer-country has ever offered such hugely lucrative concessions
to the big oil companies.”).
298. See BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 4.
299. See Chip Cummins & Hassan Hafidh, Iraqi Oil Wealth Stays Locked Up, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 20, 2007, at A8; Kurds Speak Out Against Key Oil Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 11, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-07-11-iraq-oil-law_N.htm; Nobel Laureates
Condemn Iraq Oil Law, U.S., UPI, June 20, 2007, http://www.upi.com/Science_News/
Resource-Wars/2007/06/20/Nobel-laureates-condemn-Iraq-oil-law-US/UPI-63571182375086/;
Joshua Partlow, Missteps and Mistrust Marks the Push for Legislation, WASH. POST, Sept. 5,
2007, at Foreign A12; Sunni Clerics Group Attacks Iraq’s Draft Oil Law, REUTERS, Mar. 6,
2007,  http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/PAR649745.htm; Jonathan Steele, Good
News from Baghdad at Last: The Oil Law Has Stalled, GUARDIAN, Aug. 3, 2007, at 35; Top
Iraq MP: No Oil Law under Occupation, UPI, Aug. 3, 2007, http://www.upi.com/Science_
News/Resource-Wars/2007/08/03/Top-Iraq-MP-No-oil-law-under-occupation/UPI-
71641186174090/; Erik Leaver & Greg Muttitt, Slick Connections: U.S. Influence on Iraqi Oil,
In the United States, Section 1314 of FY2007 Supplemental
Appropriations Act espoused that the “passage of oil and gas sector
framework and revenue sharing legislation” were “important benchmarks that
would indicate the current Iraqi government’s commitment to promoting
political reconciliation and long term economic development.”293
Consequently, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appointed a three-member Oil
and Energy Committee to draft legislation.294  In February 2007, al-Maliki’s
cabinet approved the Committee’s product.295  To become binding, the bill
required legislative approval, but there were no public consultations, hearings,
parliamentary committee debates, or investigations.296  The Bush
administration, oil companies, and the IMF had received copies of the bill,
and the British Parliament debated the bill and its consequences,297 but the
Kurdish delegation, which held 53 of the 275 seats in the parliament,
complained on the eve of the scheduled vote that its members had not yet seen
the proposed law.298
The bill met fierce resistance from the public, economists, government
officials, politicians, trade unions, organizations, and various sector interests
which emphasized that external investment was unnecessary to develop
energy resources.299  There were large protests and oil workers went on
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FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS 1 (July 17, 2007), http://www.carbonweb.org/documents/Slick_
Connections.pdf.
300. David Bacon, Iraqi Worker’s Strike to Keep Their Oil,  DOLLARS & SENSE, Sept./Oct.
2007, at 272; Claudia Parsons, Iraqi Union Leader Urges Opposition to Oil Law, REUTERS,
June 18, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN18475951. 
301. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR: THE TRUE
COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT 220 (2008); 419 Iraqi Intellectuals Reject Proposed Oil Law, 50
MIDDLE EAST ECON. SURVEY (Aug. 13, 2007), http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/v50
n33-5OD02.htm. 
302. Mahdi, supra note 98; BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 5.
303. BLANCHARD, supra note 73.
304. See Cynthia A. Bolden & Jerrod Fussnecker, The Status of Kirkuk Under Article 140
of the Iraqi Constitution: The Need for Adjudication By the Iraqi Supreme Court as Part of an
Integrated Solution, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (2009); James Glanz, Iraq Compromise on
Oil Law Seems to Be Collapsing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2007, at A1; Iraq MP: Kurds,
Government Stall Oil Law, UPI, Jan. 10, 2008, http://www.upi.com/Science_News/ Resource-
Wars/2008/01/10/Iraq-MP-Kurds-government-stall-oil-law/UPI-56181200004114/;  Kramer,
supra note 283 (proposed law still “pending in Parliament”); Alissa J. Rubin, Iraqi Lawmakers
Split on Oil Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/22/world/
middleeast/22cnd-iraq.html; Susman, supra note 292.
305. BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 1; Bolden & Fussnecker, supra note 304 at 1578; Iraq
Oil Law a Priority, PM Hopeful Allawi Says, REUTERS, Mar. 31, 2010, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE62U1CO20100331.
strike.300  Over four hundred leading academics, industry experts, and
engineers provided a written interpretation of the bill and contended that “it
is clear that the Iraqi government is trying to implement one of the demands
of the American occupation” and the legislative framework “lays the
foundation for a fresh plundering of Iraq’s strategic wealth and its
squandering by foreigners, backed by those coveting power in the regions,
and by gangs of thieves and pillagers.”301  Furthermore, Professor Kamil
Mahdi remarked that the bill had only been discussed “behind closed doors,”
that parliament and the government had not yet proven to be “capable of
protecting the country’s sovereignty and the people’s rights and interests,”
and that it would not be in Iraq’s best interest or “fair” to pass a law that
permitted long-term contracts under occupation without conditions of
peace.302
An April 2008 Congressional CRS Report emphasized the highly-public
consternation over “foreign participation,” but also cited the “proper role and
powers of federal and regional authorities in regulating oil and gas
development” and revenue sharing formulas as key sources of
disagreement.303  After months of parliamentary haggling over alternative
language, debates on the cabinet-approved bill terminated without
agreement.304  Other draft laws are still being considered.305  Nonetheless,
apposite language, toiled over during the drafting of the proposed 2007 oil
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
242 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63:193
306. Shafiq, supra note 272. 
307. Nicole B. Herther-Spiro, Can Ethnic Federalism Prevent “Recourse to Rebellion?” A
Comparative Analysis of the Ethiopian and Iraqi Constitutional Structures, 21 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. 321, 361 (2007).
308. See IOG LAW, supra note 246, art. 5.
309. Id. at 4(38), 5(C)(6); see BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 4.
310. IOG LAW, supra note 246, art. 5.
311. Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), at 567
(referencing UN General Assembly Resolutions 1803, 3821, 3201, 3171, 3016).
312. Articles 1, 25, 108, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005, available at http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf.
and gas law, illustrates clashing international and domestic interests, the
commodity market uncertainty existing at the time, and the consequences for
current and future potential developments.
The proposed law was not comprehensive, but provided a broad and terse
skeletal framework that required supplementation.306  It emphasized
investment procedures without clear government/producer revenue sharing
formulae and introduced potentially complex overlapping agency
responsibilities.307  The failed bill makes five federal-level entities responsible
for regulating and administering Iraq’s oil and gas industry: (1) the Council
of Representatives enacts all legislation; (2) the Council of Ministers proposes
legislation, policy, and monitors the Oil Ministry; (3) the Federal Oil and Gas
Council (FOGC) assists policymaking, coordinates regional responsibilities,
proposes legislation, changes, and authorizes “Exploration and Production
Contracts” and “Rights,” and ensures that resources are discovered,
developed, and produced; (4) the Ministry of Oil proposes federal policy and
laws, consults with regional authorities, spearheads international negotiations,
and enforces the law; and (5) the Iraqi National Oil Company participates in
exploration and production operations, and forms subsidiary companies.308
The FOGC wields overall authority.  It is comprised mostly of appointed
cabinet ministers, but also includes regional representatives and a “panel of
oil experts from inside and outside Iraq.”309  The sixth actor incorporates
federalism—Provincial Authorities participate in contracting and collaborate
with the Ministry to monitor and supervise industry activities.310  While public
interests could be well represented in industry processes with so many entities
involved, excessively-overlapping authorities might also create confusion and
abet responsibility-shirking.
B. Public Interest and Production Rights
U.N. principles affirm that a “sovereign state has the sole power to control
its natural resources.”311  The Iraqi Constitution states that “oil and gas is the
property of all the Iraqi people in all the regions and provinces,”312 but regions
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313. Id. at art. 108, 111(1), 117.3; see Herther-Spiro, supra note 307, at 361; Vanessa J.
Jimenez, Iraq’s Constitutional Process: Challenges and the Road Ahead, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF
21, 23 (2005)
314. IOG LAW, supra note 246, arts. 9(4), 13.
315. Id., at preamble, art. 13(A)(B)(F).
316. Id., arts. 5(C), 9, 10(B)(C)(D); BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 4.
317. See supra notes 176, 246, 299-303; see infra notes 318-34.  Licenses are also being
considered in more recent investment projects.  Kadhim Ajrash, Iraq Oil Ministry Recommends
Approving Shell Gas Project, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-03-30/iraq-oil-ministry-recommends-approving-shell-gas-project-1 -
.html?cmpid=msnmoney.
318. See Bindemann, supra note 107, at 11. 
319. MAZEN LABBAN, SPACE, OIL & CAPITAL 118-19 (2008); Robert Bejesky, Investing in
the Dragon: Managing the Patent Versus Trade Secret Protection Decision for the
Multinational Corporation in China, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 437, 462 (2004).
320. LABBAN, supra note 319, at 9-11; see supra Part III.
321. IOG LAW, supra note 246, art. 9(B)(3).
322. See Bindemann, supra note 107, at 9-17.
and the federal government exercise those rights and interests.313  The bill’s
language generally affirmed these principles,314 with perpetual resource rights
remaining with the local government or “people,” while permitting the grant
of an “exclusive right” to conduct “Exploration and Production” over a
geographical “Contract Area” for a time period.315  “Exploration and
Production Rights” can be granted by a “Regional Authority” or the Oil
Ministry, with the FOGC holding ultimate authority over contract terms and
approval.316 A core contention was whether PSAs would be the standard
foreign investment vehicle.317  PSAs can more fully approximate a long-term
restrictive property right than a contract, license, service agreement, or joint
venture,318 all of which would normally incorporate more host government
financial and regulatory discretion over investor operations.319  PSAs provide
greater investor certainty and control, and shift a higher percentage of
risk/reward to the investor.  Typical PSA terms, however, do not endow
virtual property rights over resources as concessions once did in the pre-
OPEC colonial-style agreement.320
The bill did not overly embrace any specific investment vehicle, but stated
that “contractual terms” will vary and “take account of the specific
characteristics and requirements of the individual area, . . . whether resources
are discovered or not, the risks and potential rewards . . . and the
technological and operational challenges presented.”321  This guiding
provision emphasized discretion, but other applicable provisions implied
governing investor right parameters that are typically found in a PSA or
concession agreement and there were no provisions that direct alternative
contract forms.322  The CRS Report to Congress alluded to the PSA
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323. BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 5 (emphasis added).  The OEWG preferred PSAs and
contended that they are standard industry practice.  STATE DEP’T, supra note 156, at 4-5;
Greenfield & Todesco, supra note 91, at 99 (different perception of common investment
vehicles).
324. IOG LAW, supra note 246, arts. 13(A)(B)(E)(F).
325. See id.  Word count retrieves seventy-five instances of “exploration and production”
right or contract.  See id.
326. See Christiana Ochoa, From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding the
Externalities of a Functional Odious Debt Doctrine, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 109, 135 (2008).
327. IOG LAW, supra note 246, art. 20.
328. SVETLANA TSALIK & ANYA SCHIFFRIN, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, COVERING OIL: A
controversy when it noted that the bill does not mandate the use of PSAs but
acknowledged that “the law states that contract holders may be given
exclusive rights to exploration, development, production, and marketing of
Iraqi oil for specified periods. . .”323  
Article 13(A) of the draft bill states that an “Exploration and Production
Contract shall give the holder an exclusive right to conduct Petroleum
Exploration and Production in the Contract Area.”  If there is a “Discovery,”
Article 13(E) provides that the “right may be retained by the holder” to
“determine the commercial value of a Discovery” for two to four years.
Article 13(F) explains that the “holder . . . may retain the exclusive right to
develop and produce Petroleum” for fifteen to twenty years, as determined by
the FOGC.324  The question is what level of discretion was intended by the
FOGC approval process, how the FOGC would have exercised authority, and
at what point the "holder" would have had a continuous and indivisible right.
The bill referred to “Exploration and Production Contract” in substantive
provisions seventy-three times as a single unit and never defined or
referenced “exploration” or “production” contracts separately from one
another.325  Possibly this is because foreign investors have a risk/return payoff
expectation, which would presumably not involve fronting investment capital
for exploration on a pro bono basis.
High-profile dissent over the bill seemed to flow from such ambiguities
and highlighted how long-term property rights inevitably collide with public
interest.326  Holders might reap lottery rewards with vested rights that are
seemingly irrevocable by subsequent administrations.  If an “Exploration and
Production Right” is granted, the contract area could be fully exploited for the
PSA duration, with the only clear exception being national policy production
level restrictions that “shall be applied in a fair and equitable manner and on
a pro-rata basis.”327  Viewed only from this bill's superficial framework, if a
“Contract Area” yields $500 billion in market price revenues, the holder
captures the revenues as reduced by what normally could be various oil
distribution, tax, profit, bonus, and royalty sharing processes.328  With the
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REPORTER’S GUIDE TO ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT 76-77 (2005); Nutavoot Pongsiri,
Partnerships in Oil and Gas Production-sharing Contracts, 17 INT’L J. PUB. SECTOR MGMT.
432-35 (2004); Bindemann, supra note 107, at 15. 
329. IOG LAW, supra note 246, art. 34; see also Mahdi, supra note 72, at 19 (calling 12.5
percent royalty an “excessively high rate of profit” to the “exploration and production right”
holder).
330. IOG LAW, supra note 246, arts. 9, 10(B)(C)(D).  But see Pepe Escobar, US’s Iraq Oil
Grab is a Done Deal, ASIA TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007 (explaining that the legal status of oil fields
and revenue sharing remain unclear under proposed law).
331. BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 5.
332. Mahdi, supra note 72, at 17.
333. Id. at 19.
334. See infra notes 351-64.
recent oil price fluctuations and trends, rent-seeking shifts between the “Right
Holder” and the Iraqi public interest in the resource not only involve risks
associated with discovery and production, but now implicate the possibility
that revenues could be generated at per barrel market prices as high as $147.
The only revenue sharing arrangement in the 2007 draft bill was in Article
34, which provides that the right “holder . . . shall pay” a royalty of 12.5
percent of production (to someone).329  The other operative provision
governing revenue allocation involved the previously-referenced contract
discretion, based on the “specific characteristics” of the “Contract Area”
when “Exploration and Production Rights” are granted.330  Revenue Watch
Middle East director Yahia Said remarked: “[T]he aim of this law from the
beginning was to promote foreign investment in Iraq’s oil sector.  Yet while
the law opens the door for foreign companies, there are careful, deliberate
mechanisms in place to maintain control in the hands of national
government.”331  Professor Mahdi disagreed and contended that Iraqi national
and regional authorities are weak, lack “negotiating or economic strength,”
and “will likely be forced to rely on contracts preferential to foreign oil
companies.”332  He further explained that the “range of measures” presented
in the bill opens the door to later privatization.333
Given such discretionary authority within Iraq’s incipient democracy, some
could contend that granting “Right Holders” two-decade-long PSAs that
generate market price revenues, with potential production quantity discretion,
unduly undermines public interest and conflicts with the Constitution’s
affirmation that “oil and gas is the property of all the Iraqi people.”  The
Constitution provides some basis for undoing a granted PSA, which is
precisely what many Iraqi political leaders have already argued for with
regard to recently granted production rights.334  Whether a “Right” can be
annulled, from the perspective of either public interest or investor risk,
however, depends on interaction among several provisions.  
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335. Article 25, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of
2005, available at http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf.
336. Id. at art. 26.
337. Id. at art. 112(2).
338. Id. at art. 23; see M.H. Mendelson, Compensation for Expropriation: The Case Law,
79 AM. J. INT’L L. 414 (1985) (noting that how to quantify “just compensation” for long-term
contract rights involving natural resources is a enduring international law issue).
339. Section 2, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of
2005, available at http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf.  All aforementioned
provisions except for article 112 appear in this section.  Id.
340. See IOG LAW, supra note 246; see also Andrew George, We Had to Destroy the
Country to Save It: On the Use of Partition To Restore Public Order During Occupation, 48
VA. J. INT’L L. 187, 187 n.1 (2007) (noting that Bush administration officials openly spoke of
“partitioning” Iraq into three countries).
341. Article 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of
Article 25 of the Constitution affirms that the “State shall guarantee the
reform of the Iraqi economy in accordance with modern economic principles
to insure full investment of its resources, diversification of its sources, and the
encouragement and development of the private sector.”335  Article 26 specifies
that the “State shall guarantee the encouragement of investment in the various
sectors, and this shall be regulated by law.”336  Article 112 states that the
government “shall . . . formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop
the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi
people using the most advanced techniques of the market principles and
encouraging investment.”337  Article 23 addresses the sanctity of foreign
investment: “Private property is protected. . . . Expropriation is not
permissible except for the purposes of public benefit in return for just
compensation, and this shall be regulated by law.”338  Iraqis lived in a
relatively closed, socialized, and developing country, but managed to codify
both “property rights” and proscriptive capitalist policymaking as
“Fundamental Rights and Liberties” in the Constitution.339
C. Federalism and OPEC
Iraq’s federal structure produced tension over revenue sharing, regulatory
authority, and OPEC relations.  The proposed bill geographically divided
resources into regional sectors.  This is consistent with the Constitution’s re-
codification of the federalism structure that was imposed by Article 4 of the
CPA’s Transitional Administrative Law and OEWG recommendations.340
Adhering to strict sub-national territorial prescriptive jurisdictional
prerogative, however, is not necessarily consistent with constitutional
provisions that require Iraq’s natural resource wealth be distributed in a “fair
manner”341 since some regions are more resource-endowed.342  
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(2007) (participant in constitutional processes noting that critics “argue that the [constitutional]
provisions allocating oil revenues leave too much authority to the oil-producing region” and
could conflict with international law); Sameera Fazili & Adil Ahmad Haque, Breaking, Buying,
and Building Nations, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 367, 367 (2005) (“Iraqi state composed of three
confederated regional governments” may be “setting the stage for conflict over land, water, oil,
and other resources.”).
342. BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 15.
343. Id. at 11-12, 14.
344. Herther-Spiro, supra note 307, at 363; Foreign Suitors, supra note 180.
345. Herther-Spiro, supra note 307, at 363; Foreign Suitors, supra note 180.
346. See Herther-Spiro, supra note 307, at 363.
347. See id.; Foreign Suitors, supra note 180.
348. Bolden & Fussnecker, supra note 304, at 1578.
349. See LAW OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF 2007, arts. 1(1), 2(a), 3(4), 4(1), 6 (as passed
by Iraq’s Council of Ministers, June 2007), available at http://www.krg.org/pdf/english_draft_
revenue_sharing_law.pdf;  see also Ben Lando, Iraqis Make Progress on Sharing Oil Sales,
UNITED PRESS INT’L, June 21, 2007, http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2007/
06/21/Iraqis-Make-progress-on-sharing-oil-sales/UPI-51511182440906.
350. See Iraq: In Kurdistan, Land Disputes Fuel Unrest, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 2,
2004), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/08/02/iraq-kurdistan-land-disputes-fuel-unrest.  In
March 2006, the Commission for Resolution of Real Property Disputes was created to address
claims.  BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 16.
351. See Tariq Shafiq, Kurdistan Regional Government Hydrocarbon Law: A Commentary,
MIDDLE EAST ECON. SURVEY (Sept. 18, 2006), http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/
v49n38-5OD01.htm; see also Mahdi, supra note 72, at 17 (“In the absence of a national project,
Groups generally represented self-interest in the federal-state constitutional
division343 consistent with relative population size and proven oil resources.
Sunnis purportedly preferred strong central government control over contract
negotiations, participation, and revenue control because regional reserves are
low.344  Shi’a wanted regional government negotiations but with central
government review.345  Kurds preferred rather plenary regional power in
negotiating and signing contracts346 because they are the minority population
but have regional control over substantial proven reserves.347  Alternative
draft bills do provide substantial national government control but with
significant regional negotiating authority for contracts.348  Under these
proposed provisions, the federal government would collect all revenues,
create an oversight commission, fund national priorities, and provide
“Regions and Governorates” with monthly allocations.349
Even without a foundational federal energy law, the combination of cash-
strapped authorities needing revenues and surging property right claims to oil-
rich land350 generated sub-national contracting prerogatives that may conflict
with federal governance.351  By 2007, the Kurdistan Regional Government
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%20English__2007_09_06_h14m0s42.pdf (adopting as regional law a provision stating that
“[a]ll agreements related to Production Sharing Contracts entered into by the Regional
Government prior to the entry into force of this Law, shall be subject to review by the Regional
Council”); see also Michael A. Fletcher, Iraq Oil Deal Gets Everybody’s Attention, WASH.
POST, Sept. 24, 2007, at A17, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
9/23/AR2007092300778.html (stating that the Kurds signed several contracts with foreign oil
companies before the regional law was enacted); BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 9-10, 14-15.
354. Iraq’s Budget Surplus: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On the Budget, 110th Cong. 64
(2008) (statement of Christopher M. Blanchand, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs,
Congressional Research Service); see also Ned Parker, Iraqi Political Factions Pressure Kurds,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/14/world/fg-iraq14.
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probability of lower market price.  Without this impact, nationally capping production and
imposing quotas limits supply and lowers profitability of the investing producer.
357. Iraq Eyes OPEC Top Spot, Seeks India Pact, UPI, Feb. 11, 2010, available at http://
www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/02/11/Iraq-eyes-OPEC-top-spot-seeks-
India-pact/UPI-49041265914800/; Iraq on a Collision Course with OPEC, UPI, Dec. 23, 2009,
available at http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2009/12/23/Iraq-on-collision-
course-with-OPEC/UPI-34541261587345/; Oliver Morgan, Iraq 'May Have to Quit OPEC,'
GUARDIAN, Apr. 27, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2003/apr/27/iraq.oilandpetrol.
had already signed eight PSAs with obscure oil and gas companies,352 and it
adopted its own regional oil law in August 2007.353  The contracts purportedly
"elevate[d] tensions" between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the
Iraqi federal government,354 and a Tawafia Party member called the contracts
“not legal.”355  Moreover, this situation may have upset the status quo by
creating a three-level constitutional conflict among sub-national, national, and
international authorities regarding whether there would be later adherence to
national production quotas and whether sub-nationally-granted contract rights
might permit liberal investment and production terms.356  During OPEC
diplomatic meetings, members were meeting with a new Iraqi government
that was setting ambitious production targets and seeking to depart from the
nationalized model.357
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358. Kramer, supra note 283; see also BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 11 (noting that, in
April 2008, the Oil Ministry was negotiating contracts with several major international oil
companies).
359. See BLANCHARD, supra note 73, at 10-11; Carola Hoyos, US Oil Companies Lose Out
in Iraq Auction, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 13, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/20016a3a-
e81c-11de-8a02-00144feab49a.html.
360. See Kramer, supra note 283.  But cf. Hoyos, supra note 359 (reporting that “U.S. oil
groups were all but shut out from Iraq as it completed the biggest oil field auction in history”).
361. Kramer, supra note 283 (In June 2008, Leila Benali of Cambridge Energy Research
Associates called the contracts a “foothold” for longer-term opportunities: “[T]he bigger prize
everybody is waiting for is development of the giant new fields.”); Shafiq, supra note 272 (a
drafter of the proposed Oil and Gas Law, explained that a “stampede for exploration and
development contracts at this particular juncture of Iraq’s political and economic development
would be viewed as mortgaging the reserves of future generations. It would also fuel the view
that the war was about oil."); Londoño & Ibrahim, supra note 273 (oil executives “eager to get
a foothold in Iraq”); Gina Chon, Big Oil Ready for Big Gamble in Iraq, WALL ST. J., June 24,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124579553986643975.html; Carola Hoyos & Roula
Khalaf, Will the Tap Open? Why Oil Groups Dream of the Day They Can Enter Iraq, FIN.
TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 8, 2006, available at http://admin.iraqupdates.net/scr/preview.php?
article=12459; Petroleum & Other Liquids,  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,  http://tonto.eia.doe.
gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=D [hereinafter EIA, Petroleum] (last
updated Mar. 9, 2011).
362. See Ahmed Rasheed, Iraq Lawmakers Say Will Challenge Shell Gas Deal, REUTERS,
Nov. 25, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USLP12241120081125;  Shell Secures
25-Year Access to Iraq’s Oil, Gas, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2008/nov/07/shell-acquires-25-year-access-to-natural-gas-in-so.
363. See Rasheed, supra note 362; Iraq Oil Law a Priority, supra note 305.
At the federal level, the Iraqi Oil Ministry recently consummated no-bid
contracts with companies such as Exxon Mobile, Shell, Total, BP, and
Chevron as a “stop-gap measure to bring modern skills into the fields while
the oil law was pending in Parliament.”358  It was reported that a
prequalification review process was established with competitive efficiency
reviews,359 but other reports revealed that there were forty-six foreign
companies from countries including China, India, and Russia, vying for
participation, but no-bid contracts favored American and British
multinationals.360  Media announcements of negotiations and contracting
procedures were made in June and July 2008, at the height of the highest oil
price trading in the $120 to $147 per barrel range.361  Iraq’s Parliament vowed
to challenge Oil Ministry approval of a multibillion-dollar contract that would
endow Iraq’s Southern Gas Company and Shell exclusive rights in Basra’s
southern gas fields for a twenty-five year extendable contract.362  The Oil
Ministry claimed there was no legal basis for the challenge, while a
Parliament committee contended that “Shell will seize everything” and that
the contract would not be in “Iraq’s best interests.”363  June 2009 agreements
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364. Londoño & Ibrahim, supra note 273.
365. See supra note 141, 341 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 19, 21-22 and accompanying text; see infra notes 476-79 and
accompanying text; see also  Greenstone, supra note 210 (noting that announcements of
violence influence the trading price of Iraqi bonds--i.e. price reflecting expectation of future
ability repay--and that there was a forty percent decline in trading price).
367. Cf. STIGLITZ & BILMES, supra note 301, at 116-17.
368. See Kades, supra note 61, at 1551 (“[T]he market price has never exceeded $40 a
barrel, and has, for the most part, fluctuated between $10 and $25 for the last decade.”).
369. See EIA, Petroleum, supra note 361.
370. See id.
were similarly condemned, with the Washington Post noting that “Iraqi
politicians and some veteran oil officials have said the deals are unduly
beneficial to oil giants, which are viewed warily by many in this deeply
nationalistic but cash-strapped country.”364
Pre-invasion exile proposals, particularly with regard to favoring
deregulation and subnational governance,365 resemble the system that actually
unfolded after the invasion.  Recently granted production rights also seem to
reflect substantive provisions of the failed 2007 oil and gas law.  The
informational chronology of violence, potential supply disruptions,
announcements of expeditious adoption of new laws, recalcitrance to
proposals, and then consummation of PSAs even in the absence of the law
that suggests them, took place inside one of the world’s most oil-endowed
countries.  The common denominators were uncertainty and periodic chaos,
which likely had a reverberating impact on the market.
VIII. Oil Price Surges
A. Causal Hypotheses
Market trends between 2002 and 2008 are probative to the queries of
whether domestic events inside Iraq influenced trader expectations, and
whether military security stabilizes or disrupts markets.  Because oil supply
projections impact spot and futures market trading, daily news of conflict,366
uncertainty as to the outcome of occupation, and proposals for drastic
industry restructuring367 may breed excessive risk.  From the mid-1980s until
March 2002, oil prices fluctuated within a $10 to $20 per barrel band with a
general $15 median price.368  A precipitous price rise began in mid-March
2002 at $21 and hit $147 in July 2008.369  Prices steadily dropped after July
2008 and closed in December 2008 at $36.370  In assessing whether
information about Iraq influenced market trading, it is necessary to consider
why a multitude of other explanations are not fully compelling.  A U.S.
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371. See Annual Oil Market Chronology: Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/AOMC/Overview.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2010).  This chart
was originally accompanied with a narrative that referenced labels as probative causes of price
trends.  The narrative has since been removed, but the Department of Energy’s explanations
were cited in other sources.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-25,
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION: TRENDS IN ENERGY DERIVATIVES MARKET
RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT CFTC’S OVERSIGHT 22 (2007) [hereinafter GAO, DERIVATIVES],
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0825.pdf.
372. Respective futures contract prices are similar to but often slightly higher than the spot
rate.  NYMEX Futures Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/
pet_pri_fut_s1_d.htm (last updated Mar. 9, 2011).  This generally indicates a normal uncertainty
band and/or expected increasing price trend.  See generally the dates cited in infra text for a
Department of Energy graph covering price trends through December 2007
provides a starting point.  
Tendered explanations for market fluctuations include possible uncertainty
after the 9/11 attack, the Venezuelan union strike, Hurricanes Ivan, Katrina,
and Rita, the Nigerian oil cut-offs, a rising dollar and low spare capacity, and
OPEC quota announcements.371  Many similar events occurred over the
preceding twenty years without a drastic and sustained several-year price
escalation and it is not clear that these explanations even account for short-
term fluctuations.  The following price comparisons use spot rates.372
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comparison of futures contracts 1-4 with spot rates. 
373. See EIA, Petroleum, supra note 361; see also Annual Oil Market Chronology, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/AOMC/pdf.pdf
[hereinafter EIA, Chronology] (noting that on Sept. 24, 2001, “[c]rude oil and petroleum
products futures [fell] to their lowest levels in nearly two years”).
374. EIA, Chronology, supra note 373.
375. Id. at 33.
376. See EIA, Petroleum, supra note 361.  In particular, look at the entries for April 2002.
377. EIA, Chronology, supra note 373, at 36-37.  In particular, look at the entries for Dec.
2, 2002; Dec. 16, 2002; Dec. 18, 2002; Jan. 6, 2003; Jan. 21, 2003; and Jan. 29, 2003.  See also
EIA, Petroleum, supra note 361.  In particular, look at the entries for Dec. 2002 and Jan. 2003.
378. See EIA, Petroleum, supra note 361.  In particular, look at the entry for April 10, 2003.
379. See supra note 371; see infra note 451.
380. See EIA, Production, supra note 35 (documenting how, in 2007, the United States only
produced seven percent of the world’s crude oil and how a good portion of that production was
located in away from hurricane-prone regions).
381. See EIA, Petroleum, supra note 361; Hurricane Ivan Passes Battered Cuba, CNN,
Sept. 14, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WEATHER/09/13/hurricane.ivan/index.html (noting
that Hurricane Ivan caused oil companies to evacuate offshore rigs and stop “production of
nearly 100,000 barrels of oil per day).
While one might expect that a dramatic event like 9/11 could cause market
instability, there was no significant fluctuation (the price on 9/11 was $27.65)
for nearly two weeks.373  Prices then dropped by over twenty percent (the
price on 9/25 was $21.63), hit the lowest level in over two years (the price on
11/15 was $17.50), and remained between $17 and $24 per barrel for nearly
six months (from 9/11/01 until 3/08/02).374
In early April 2002, there was a three-day coup that ousted Venezuelan
President Hugo Chávez and the U.S. Department of Energy chronology noted
that “a general strike [began] in Venezuela . . . nearly halting oil
production.”375  There was no oil price increase following the events and
prices remained between $22 and $24 throughout April.376  Rather prolonged
strikes, that began in early December 2002 and continued through most of
January 2003, were said to “dramatically” drop exports and coincided with
prices that started at $27 per barrel and fluctuated as high as $35 during this
two-month period.377  Prices eventually dropped below pre-strike levels.378
Acts of nature were also referenced as a possible cause of price
increases.379  A fractional share of global oil production takes place in
hurricane-prone regions of Mexico, Texas, Louisiana, and the Gulf of
Mexico.380  The fall 2004 hurricane season, which included Hurricane Ivan,
coincided with some higher daily prices than existed prior to the season (the
price was $46 on August 23 and was $47.30 on November 11).381  Fall 2005
was a record-setting hurricane season and included Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, but there were no drastic price increases, and the season actually
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382. See EIA, Petroleum, supra note 361; New Orleans Braces for Monster Hurricane,
CNN, Aug. 29, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WEATHER/08/28/hurricane.katrina
(documenting the build-up to Hurricane Katrina in late August 2005); Rita Growing Weaker,
Slower, CNN, Sept. 25, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WEATHER/09/24/rita/index.html
(documenting the aftermath of Hurricane Rita in late September 2005).  Cf. Charles Martel,
Bring It on Home: A Gulf Coast Marshall Plan Based on International Humanitarian
Standards, 32 VT. L. REV. 57 (2007) (discussing ways to deal with the long-term damage
caused by Katrina).
383. EIA, Chronology, supra note 373, at 49.  In particular, see the entry for Dec. 20, 2005.
384. See EIA, Petroleum, supra note 361.  Look particularly at the entries from Dec. 20,
2005 through Jan. 30, 2006 (rising from $57.81 to $68.36).
385. EIA, Chronology, supra note 373, at 49.  See the entry for Dec. 20, 2005.
386. Id.  See the entry for Feb. 21, 2006.
387. See EIA, Petroleum, supra note 361.  See the entries for Feb. 21, 2006 through March
27, 2006.
388. See OPEC, World Oil Supply, MONTHLY OIL MARKET REPORT, Mar. 2006, at 29, 34,
available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/
MR032006.pdf (noting that Nigerian oil production losses “were partly offset by increases
elsewhere”). 
389. See OPEC, World Oil Supply, MONTHLY OIL MARKET REPORT, Dec. 2006, at 33, 38,
available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/
MR122006.pdf. 
390. Oil Rebounds on Nigerian Violence, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 4, 2006, http://money.
cnn.com/2006/10/04/markets/oil_eia/index.htm
391. See infra notes 407-12, 416.
392. See Weaver, supra note 26, at 507-08.  Using “peak oil” consternation as an influence
coincided with a downward price trend (the price was $65.46 on August 22
and was $57.45 on November 11).382
On December 20, 2005, militants disrupted oil production in Nigeria, and
Shell declared “force majeure on its crude oil exports from the country.”383
There was a fairly steep incline in price that began one week after the
disruption,384 but by then Shell had already made repairs and kept production
flowing.385  Continued conflict in Nigera required Shell to extend force
majeure on exports, which amounted to one-fifth of Nigeria’s production.386
However, oil prices remained stable387 and actual production declines were
negligible.388  Through the latter half of 2006, Nigeria’s production was
approximately 5% lower,389 but by October global market prices dropped to
new eight-month lows when it was announced that U.S. oil inventories were
actually “bulging.”390  Moreover, Nigeria’s drop involved only 0.7% of global
production and it appears that other OPEC members compensated for that
decrease.391
Scholars generally have not attempted to quantify an informational impact
of the “diminishing supply” and “peak oil” contentions that garnered much
media attention as prices rose,392 but offer a range of tangible hypotheses393
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on price would seem to require an assumption that traders adapted forecasting models and
expectations either because tangible effects of depletion were plausible or because producer
behavior might adapt to allegations.  Perhaps the most dominant informational impact would
be on consumer perceptions, but that does not set oil or gasoline prices.
393. See Stéphane Dées et al., Assessing the Factors Behind Oil Price Changes, (European
Cent. Bank, Working Paper Series No. 855, 2008), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/
pdf/scpwps/ecbwp855.pdf. 
394. See generally id.; see also INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK TECH.
REP. (2007); Griffin & Xiong, supra note 279, at 290-91; Rhea, supra note 26, at 610.
395. Weaver, supra note 26, at 513.
396. STEO Supplement: Why Are Oil Prices So High?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/pdf/high-oil-price.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
397. Global Oil Supply Disruptions Since 1951, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/security/distable.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2010).  Labor strikes and
unrest in Venezuela caused an estimated 2.1 million barrel per day (pbd) drop for three months
(from Dec. 2002 until Feb. 2003); unrest in Nigeria caused a drop of 0.3 pbd for six months
(from Mar. 2003 until Aug. 2003); and the Iraq war caused a one million pbd decrease for
nineteen months (from Mar. 2003 until Sept. 2004).  Id.  However, the Venezuela strikes did
not seem to have a significant impact on market price, the Nigerian drops were minor, and
decreases in Iraqi supply are questionable.  See supra notes 285, 375-78, 383-91.  Also, it seems
that OPEC countries increased supply to accommodate non-OPEC decreases.  See infra notes
407-12, 416.
398. See The Structure of the Oil Market and Causes of High Prices, INT’L MONETARY FUND
(Sept. 21, 2005), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/092105o.htm [hereinafter INT’L
MONETARY FUND].
399. See id. (noting that with “perception of a limited response of investment . . .
[p]roduction capacity is unlikely to grow enough to outpace future growth in consumption”);
see also Bassan Fattough, Spare Capacity and Oil Price Dynamics, MIDDLE EAST ECON.
that reflect orthodox explanations for price increases, which is that lower
supply or perceptions of shortfall to service demand begets rising prices.394
Department of Energy reports asserted that traders reacted to soaring demand
from India and China,395 that there was a perceived ineffective industry
reaction to revived economic conditions following the late-1990s Asian
financial crisis, that demands pressed upon non-OPEC countries failed to
meet expectations, that there was low OPEC spare capacity to increase
production, and that geopolitical instability in Iraq, Nigeria, Venezuela and
Iran generated uncertainty396 and some unanticipated supply disruptions.397
Another report suggested that trading instability was abetted by industry
weaknesses in “timely data collection, more efficient taxation, improved
investment environment, and energy conservation.”398
With so many potential supply-side effects for increasing price trends,
perhaps a plausible explanation is that there may have been an actual or
perceived lack of investment in infrastructure to support increased demand
and/or risk of shortfall.399  However, the uncertainty in this explanation is that
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SURVEY (Jan. 30, 2006), http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/v49n05-5OD01.htm; GAO,
DERIVATIVES, supra note 371, at 4; IPAA, supra note 17.
400. Lutz Kilian, Oil Price Volatility: Origin and Effects, World Trade Org. Research &
Analysis (2010), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_forum_
e/wtr10_kilian_e.htm ("There is no consensus in the literature on how to model the global
market for crude oil.").  However, three implications for recent price trends on models are: [1]
that "endogenous determination of real price of oil. . . are best thought of as the response to an
average oil price shock. . . . [2] It is more appropriate to think of oil price fluctuations as
symptoms of the underlying oil demand and oil supply shocks. . . . [3][fixed variable theoretical
models] are misleading and must be replaced by models that allow for the endogenous
determination of the price of oil.".  Id.
401. See, e.g., Oil Market Report, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, 5-17 (Sept. 10, 2009), http://
omrpublic.iea.org/currentissues/full.pdf. 
402. Global crude oil production increased from 64 million barrels per day (bpd) (2002), to
67 million (2003), 70.5 million (2004), 71.6 million (2005), 71.7 million (2006), 71.4 million
(2007), and 72 million (2008).  OPEC, ASB, supra note 17, at 22; see also Production of Crude
Oil Including Lease Condensate (Thousand Barrels Per Day), U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=1&cid=&syi
d=2002&eyid=2008&unit=TBPD (last visited Sept. 23, 2010).  Production increased by
approximately three million bpd from 2002 to 2004 but consumption only marginally increased
from 2005 to 2008.  See OPEC, ASB, supra note 17, at 22.  If actual demand increased at a
moderately linear rate, then supply did not service demand.  However, in 2005, the price per
barrel was hitting record highs, generally fluctuating for most of the year between $50 and $70
per barrel, which was a fairly drastic increase over the $35-$55 range of the previous year.  See
EIA, Petroleum, supra note 361.  It is not clear if stagnant consumption bred lower demand
from the global economic downtrend, if supply did not service actual demand to cause a price
hike, or if already higher oil prices weakened demand.  All of these are causes antecedent to
actual lower consumption.
403. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 398. 
404. Id.
investments in available reserves to increase supply also depend upon what
the hypothetical demand level would be if the price of oil products was not
already endogenous to currently-prevailing economic conditions.400  Countries
periodically submit estimated demand to the International Energy Agency
(“IEA”),401 but anticipated consumption derives from existing market prices
and expected economic growth.  Some percentage of the "lack of investment"
causation may be premised on a hypothetical scenario of abundant
consumption irrespective of price.402  It is not clear that there were unexpected
production limitations before substantial price hikes began in mid-March
2002.  As prices rose to new highs, a 2005 IMF report recognized this, but
with a caveat.403  It noted that “crude oil demand growth for 2005 has so far
been broadly in line with IEA projections, [and] while supply (with non-
OPEC supply shortfalls offset by higher OPEC output) appears adequate . .
. strong demand continues to put pressure on production capacity.”404
Likewise, statistics readily available in 2007 and 2008 indicated that crude oil
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405. See infra note 412.
406. See infra Part VIII.B.
407. OPEC, ASB, supra note 17, at 31.
408. Id. at 34.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 22.
411. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 398; see also Carey, supra note 7, at 806.
412. See Press Release, OPEC, Statement by HE Abdalla Salem El-Badri, Secretary General
of OPEC, on Oil Market Fundamentals (June 14, 2007), available at http://www.opec.org/
opec_web/en/press_room/1150.htm; Press Release, OPEC, 146th (Extraordinary) Meeting of
the OPEC Conference (Dec. 5, 2007) [hereinafter OPEC, 146], available at http://www.opec.
org/opec_web/press_room/1006.htm; Press Release, OPEC, 148th Meeting of the OPEC
Conference (Mar. 5, 2008) [hereinafter OPEC, 148], available at http://www.opec.org/opec_
web/en/961.htm; Press Release, OPEC, Press Statement by HE Abdalla Salem El-Badri, OPEC
Secretary General (May 8, 2008) [hereinafter OPEC, EL-Badri (May 8)], available at
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/957.htm; Press Release, OPEC, 149th Meeting of the OPEC
Conference (Sept. 10, 2008) [hereinafter OPEC, 149], available at http://www.opec.org/
opecna/press%20releases/2008/pr112008.htm.
413. OPEC Statute, supra note 110, art. 3 ("Member Countries shall fulfill, in good faith, the
obligations assumed by them in accordance with this Statute."); see infra note 414 (meeting
announcements referencing agreements to maintain quotas keeps the status quo, whereas
modifying creates a new status quo).
inventories across consuming nations were plentiful, but market prices kept
increasing to their highest levels as if there were shortfalls.405
B. OPEC as “Scapegoat”
OPEC supply announcements and actual supply have been blamed for
price increases, but this is not a compelling explanation.406  From 2002 to
2008, OPEC exports steadily appreciated from an average of 18.8 million
barrels per day to 24.2 million,407 which increased OPEC’s share of world oil
exports from 52.8% to 60.3%.408  Over this six-year period, global supply
grew by 12.5%409 and OPEC’s share grew from 40% to 46% of total
production.410  Before drastic price surges, the organization had been
following a preferred $22 to $28 per barrel price band policy, but as prices
appreciated the IMF noted that “OPEC has kept production and official
quotas at record levels.”411  Again, during the highest price trends in 2007 and
2008, importing countries often held historically high inventories, signaling
no risk of shortfall, and OPEC members consistently monitored the market
to ensure that it was sufficiently supplied.412
Moreover, it does not appear that OPEC supply announcements were
opportunistic.  When OPEC members modify a production quota, it is a new
international agreement that remains until it is overridden by a later quota
agreement.413  An agreement to increase quotas maintains the higher
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414. See EIA, Chronology, supra note 373, at 32, 34-38, 40-47, 49-51.  In particular, look
at these dates: Mar. 15, 2002; June 26, 2002; Sept. 19, 2002; Dec. 12, 2002; Jan., 12, 2003; Mar.
11, 2003; Apr. 24, 2003; June 11, 2003; July 31, 2003; Sept. 24, 2003; Dec. 4, 2003; Feb. 11,
2004; June 3, 2004; Dec. 10, 2004; Jan. 30, 2005; Mar. 16, 2005; June 15, 2005; Jan. 31, 2006;
Mar. 8, 2006; June 1, 2006; Sept. 11, 2006; Oct. 19, 2006; and Dec. 14, 2006.  See also Press
Release, OPEC, 144th Meeting of the OPEC Conference (Mar. 15, 2007), available at http://
www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/1155.htm; Press Release, OPEC, 145th Meeting of the
OPEC Conference (Sept. 11, 2007), available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_
room/1011.htm; Press Release, OPEC, 147th (Extraordinary) Meeting of the OPEC Conference
(Feb. 1, 2008), available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/962.htm; Press Release, OPEC,
150th (Extraordinary) Meeting of the OPEC Conference (Oct. 24, 2008) [hereinafter OPEC,
150], available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/947.htm; Press Release, OPEC, 151st
(Extraordinary) Meeting of the OPEC Conference (Dec. 17, 2008) [hereinafter OPEC, 151],
available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/945.htm; OPEC, 146, supra note 376; OPEC,
148, supra note 412; OPEC, 149, supra note 412.
415. See EIA, Chronology, supra note 373, at 36-37, 40, 46-48.  In particular, look at these
dates: Dec. 12, 2002; Jan. 12, 2003; Apr. 24, 2003; Mar. 16, 2005; June 15, 2005; and Sept. 11,
2007); see also EIA, Petroleum, supra note 361.  See the entries for the corresponding dates and
daily price trend fluctuations following those dates.
416. EIA, Chronology, supra note 373, at 32, 34, 39, 45, 50.  See the entries for Mar. 15,
2002; June 26, 2002; Apr. 24, 2003; Dec. 10, 2004; and June 1, 2006.  See also Jad Mouawad,
OPEC to Lift Oil Output Modestly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2007, at C1; OPEC, El-Badri (May
8), supra note 412; Member Countries’ Crude Oil Production Allocations, OPEC, http://
www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/data_graphs/ProductionLeve
ls.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2010); EIA, Petroleum, supra note 361 (see the entries for the
corresponding dates and daily price trend fluctuations following those dates).
417. EIA, Chronology, supra note 373, at 42-43, 51.  See the entries for Sept. 24, 2003; Feb.
11, 2004; Oct. 19, 2006; and Dec. 14, 2006.
production.  Between March 2002 and December 2008, there were at least
thirty OPEC production announcements emanating from official meetings and
semi-official fora.414  Production quotas were increased six times, and on five
of those occasions market prices still appreciated following the
announcement,415 which may be inconsistent with the expectation that
increasing supply will lower price. 
Most important is the trend of sustained higher production.  Using the
quota announcement on March 15, 2002 as a benchmark, which occurred just
before the sustained price increases began, announced production quotas were
higher than the reference point by 17% on April 24, 2003, 27% on December
10, 2004, 29% on June 1, 2006, 25% on September 12, 2007, and 25% on
May 8, 2008.416  Six quota decreases were also announced over the same
period, but the first four cuts were between 2% and 4% of the preceding
production quota and on each occasion it was recognized that overproduction
led to building inventories in consuming nations.417  The logistics process of
production, transportation, refining, and consumption is not geared to “supply
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419. OPEC, 151, supra note 414; EIA, Petroleum, supra note 361 (see the entry for Dec. 17,
2008).
420. See F. Wirl & A. Kujundzic, The Impact of OPEC Conference Outcomes on World Oil
Prices 1984!2001, 25(1) Energy J. 45 (2004) (noting weak impact of announcements on price);
see also supra note 414 (see EIA interpretive commentary for referenced dates and referenced
news sources).
421. See EIA, Chronology, supra note 373, at 34, 36, 38, 40, 43-46, 49.  See the entries for
June 26, 2002; Dec. 12, 2002; Mar. 11, 2003; Apr. 24, 2003; Feb. 11, 2004; May 22, 2004; Dec.
10, 2004; Mar. 16, 2005; and Feb. 8, 2006).
422. See OPEC Analysis Brief, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 26, 2004), http://
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/opec.html; see also James Bixby, The 2005 Energy Policy Act:
Lessons on Getting Alternative Fuels to the Pump for Minnesota’s Ethanol Regulations, 26 J.
L. & POL’Y 353, 355 n.10 (2008); see supra  chart in Part VIII.
423. See IPAA, supra note 17, at 1; NYMEX and ICE’s Long-Standing Rivalry, REUTERS,
Nov. 30, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE5AT3GF20091130. 
as much and as fast as possible,” but is a planning process to ensure that
bottlenecks do not prevail in the system.  The fifth OPEC cut on October 24,
2008 was based on a “slowdown in oil demand” due to the “financial crisis”
and purported oversupply.418  The sixth cut on December 17, 2008 cited a
need to stabilize the market after prices had plummeted to $36 per barrel.419
While OPEC meetings are often accompanied by enormous pageantry and
commentary on the content and meaning of announcements, the data does not
suggest that traders do not trust OPEC members or the status quo supply
system.420  Likewise, congressional demands for a WTO dispute settlement
action against OPEC members for colluding and/or failing to produce more
rapidly cannot be sustained on the facts.  OPEC maintained record level
quotas, produced at those elevated levels throughout the duration of high
prices, made guarantees that there would be no shortfall, and overproduced
on quotas.421  If there is merit to the congressional chastisements, allegations
of wrongdoing would need to be premised on the mere fact that OPEC exists,
rather than on the organization partaking in acts of extortive collusion.
Department of Energy statistics indicate that there were no drastic price
movements (excepting 1991 Gulf War circumstances) from the mid-1980s
until 2002, but the Department also surprisingly contended in its 2006 OPEC
Analysis Brief that member countries had colluded to maintain artificially
high prices since 1982.422  One cannot unequivocally refute this hypothesis
because price movements within a $10 to $20 band will be “artificial” if one
juxtaposes a hypothesized world where but for OPEC’s existence, the
commodity would trade at $5 per barrel.  The contention seems particularly
unrealistic because shortly after crude oil futures began being traded on the
New York Mercantile Exchange in 1983,423 prices substantially dropped and
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424. See Retail Gasoline Historical Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.
gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/wrgp/mogas_history.html (click “All Grades”; then
open Microsoft Excel spreadsheet; then choose Data Set 1) (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) (listing
historical datasets); Weekly U.S. Midgrade Conventional Retail Gasoline Prices, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MG_MCO_
US&f=W (last visited Sept. 24, 2010). 
425. JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 6, at 1.
426. See David Goldman, Fed Could Burst Oil’s Bubble, CNNMONEY.COM, Apr. 29, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/04/29/news/economy/oil_dollar/index.htm?postversion=200804
2911.
427. See C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 238-39 (2004); Katherine
Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut: Tax Policy as the Handmaiden of Budget Policy, 41
GA. L. REV. 503, 508 (2007); Daniel N. Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush
Administration’s Policy of Cutting Taxes in the Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, 45 B.C. L.
REV. 1285, 1298 (2004).
428. See Revenues, Outlays, Deficits, Surpluses, and Debt Held by the Public, 1968 to 2007,
in Billions of Dollars, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 1 (Sept. 2008), http://www.cbo.gov/budget/data/
historical.pdf (noting that the annual account surplus/deficit was 86.4 (2000), -32.4 (2001), -
317.4 (2002), -538.4 (2003), -568.0 (2004), -493.6 (2005), -434.5 (2006), -342.2 (2007)); see
also Historical Debt Outstanding – Annual 2000-2008, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.
treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt_histo5.htm (last updated Nov. 17, 2009)
(listing the national debt (in trillions) over the past decade as $5.674 (2000), $5.807 (2001),
$6.228 (2002), $6.783 (2003), $7.379 (2004), $7.933 (2005), $8.507 (2006), $9.008 (2007), and
$10.025 (2008)).
429. OPEC, ASB, supra note 17, at 13; see Christopher Johnson, OPEC Oil, Gas Income
Tops $1 Trillion, Reserves Up, REUTERS, July 8, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/id
USTRE5673L920090708; OPEC Oil Export Revenues, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/OPEC_Revenues/Factsheet.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2010). 
remained low.  Throughout this period, this translated into gasoline prices for
consumers that rarely rose above $1.30 per gallon.424
Republican Congressman Jim Saxton’s February 2008 Joint Economic
Committee Report, entitled Expect No Relief From OPEC, blamed American
economic ills on OPEC’s purported objective to “maximize the wealth
transfer from oil consuming nations by manipulating the international oil
market.”425  OPEC President Chakib Khelil’s retort blamed the weak U.S.
dollar for high oil prices.426  That “weakened dollar” could have been
significantly due to the Bush administration’s foreign wars that blew a hole
in the current account deficit427 and contributed to doubling the national
debt.428  Undeniably, with higher trading prices, OPEC countries did attain
higher revenues, which increased from $216 billion (2002) to $267 billion
(2003), $375 billion (2004), $555 billion (2005), $662 billion (2006), $745
billion (2007) and $1 trillion (2008).429  These are not “profits,” but sales
“revenues.”  By comparison, in 2004, British and American oil giants (BP
Amoco, Shell, Exxon Mobil, Total, Chevron Texaco, and ConocoPhillips)
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430. VICTORS & YARROW, supra note 280, at 12.  OPEC state-owned company profit
margins are apt to be much higher than the vertically-integrated multinationals.
431. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 49, available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/budget/defense.pdf. 
432. See supra notes 45-50, 218-23, 231-33.
433. See, e.g., M.A. Adelman, Oil Resource Wealth of the Middle East, 4 ENERGY STUD.
REV. 7 (1992); Clifton Jones, OPEC Behavior Under Falling Oil Prices: Implications for Cartel
Stability, 11 ENERGY J. 117 (1990); Jesica E. Seacor, Comment, Environmental Terrorism:
Lessons From the Oil Fires of Kuwait, 10 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 481, 504 n.99 (1994).
434. See generally ALI D. JOHANY, THE MYTH OF THE OPEC CARTEL: THE ROLE OF SAUDI
ARABIA (1980); Gaurav Sodhi, The Myth of OPEC, CTR. FOR INDEP. STUDIES (June 24, 2008),
http://www.cis.org.au/media-information/opinion-pieces/article/302-the-myth-of-opec (arguing
that, while some consider OPEC a “boogey man,” OPEC likely “is pumping as much oil as it
can”); Kilian, supra note 400 ("the popular notion that OPEC constitutes a cartel that controls
the price of oil has not held up to scrutiny").
435. See supra notes 401, 407, 410, 414.
436. See supra notes 417-19; see also supra note 110 (Charter mission statement).
437. See EIA Analysis: OPEC, ALEXANDER’S GAS & OIL CONNECTIONS (Oct. 1, 2002),
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/features/fex24081.htm; OPEC Cuts Oil Production in Move to
Boost Prices, FOXNEWS.COM, Oct. 24, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,443913,
00.html; Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, N.Y. TIMES TOPICS, March 16,
2009, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/organizations/o/organization_of_
petroleum_exporting_countries/index.html. 
“revenues” exceeded $1 trillion when total OPEC revenue was $375 billion.430
OPEC maintains that supply limits exist to maintain stable prices and
taxpayers spend $651 billion annually on the Department of Defense,431 which
apparently has one prime mission of “protecting” global oil supply.432
Some contend that OPEC has lost power over time,433 and others maintain
that OPEC serves as an economic “boogey man” deficient of the power often
attributed to it.434  The contentions are arguable but highlight one of the most
prominent responsibility-dodging arrangements that exist.  Consuming
countries provide demand estimates and OPEC announces periodic quota
adjustments.435  If OPEC announces a quota cut, it may even specifically state
that market prices should be higher, but it generally justifies quota decisions
on whether there are adequate supplies and consuming nation inventories.436
If OPEC announces a quota cut and normal market expectations prevail,
traders presumably react to the announcement and the market surmises that
supply will actually decrease, make the commodity more valuable, and
appreciate price.  However, this is not always the market reaction.  Since
1993, OPEC has announced twelve quota reductions and eighty percent of the
time those cuts did eventually correlate with prices that did not further
decrease below the preferred price band.437  If price does increase, OPEC
members sell at the higher price, leading to their fortunate income
appreciation, while multinationals attain higher revenues from their own
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Don't Blame Us For Prices - Oil Execs, CNN.COM, available at http://money.cnn.com/2008/
05/21/news/economy/oil_hearing/index.htm; infra note 451.
441. See Weaver, supra note 26, at 574.
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Than Meets the Eye (June 14, 2001), available at http://wyden.senate.gov/issues/gas_prices/
pdfs/wyden_oil_report.pdf ("the record shows. . .that major oil companies pursued efforts to
curtail refinery capacity as a strategy for improving profit margins; that competing oil
companies worked together to subvert supply; that refinery closures inhibited supply; and that
oil companies are reaping record profits"); OPEC Q. ENVTL. NEWSL., (OPEC) (first quarter
2009), available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/
press_room/1Q09EnvNewsletter.pdf; IMF Meeting OPEC Says Producers Not to Blame For
High Oil Prices, FORBES, Apr. 22, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2006/04/22/afx2689
141.html ("Qatar's oil minister blamed high oil prices on 'horrible' speculation and 'geopolitics'
rather than any shortage of supplies."); supra notes 17, 426
443. FERENC FORGO ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF GAMES, at xvii (1985).
444. See  A. F. Alhajji, Why Do Some OPEC Members Cheat? The Case of the United Arab
Emirates, 23 J. ENERGY & DEV. 59 (1997); Sel Dibooglu & Salim N. AlGudhea, All Time
Cheaters Versus Cheaters in Distress: An Examination of Cheating and Oil Prices in OPEC,
31 ECON. SYSTEMS 292 (2007); Griffin & Xiong, supra note 279, at 290-91 (noting prevalence
of Saudi Arabia to consistently cheat to meet “residual demand at the official OPEC price”);
Arik Hesseldahl, Oil Cheating For Fun and Profit, FORBES, Aug. 26, 2002, http://www.
forbes.com/2002/08/26/0826oil.html. 
445. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Iran and Arabs Clash in OPEC on Oil Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 1987, at D1; Leo Lewis, OPEC Split in Row Over Oil ‘Cheating,’ INDEP. (London), Mar.
10, 2002, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/opec-split-in-row-over-oil-
cheating-653466.html.
446. Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87
production and refined products.438  When gasoline prices increase,
Americans blame oil companies and/or OPEC,439 oil companies blame
distribution logistics and OPEC,440 American politicians blame OPEC,441 and
OPEC blames multinationals for insufficient refining capacity, consuming
nations for excessive consumption patterns, U.S. fiscal conditions, and trader
reactions.442
As for discrepancies between announced and actual supply, OPEC
member actions suggest that they do not have the understanding and
necessary conditions to maintain a tenacious collusive equilibrium as defined
in game theory models.443  OPEC members have a history of cheating on their
agreements with each other, overproducing on quotas444 and entering into
periods of internecine accusation-casting over whether other members have
been cheating.445  The pattern has prevailed for decades without an effective
monitoring or punishment consequence to curtail future cheating.446
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Jumped 27% in Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005, at C4; Chris Isidore, Exxon Mobil Sets
Profit Record, CNNMONEY.COM, Jan. 30, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/30/news/
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by British Company, DAILY MAIL, Jan. 31 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
511387/Shells-obscene-13-9billion-profit-biggest-British-company.html; Adam Smith, BP and
Shell Downplay Record Profits, TIME, Apr. 29, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/business/
article/0,8599,1735821,00.html.
451. Vikas Bajaj, Oil Executives Defend Profits Before a Critical Congress, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/09/business/09cnd-energy.html.
452. Exxon-Mobil Earnings Jumped 27% in Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005, http://query.
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE0DD123BF932A35751C0A9639C8B63.
453. Jad Mouawad, Exxon Mobil Profit Sets Record Again, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/02/01/business/01cnd-exxon.html.
454. Shell’s ‘Obscene’ £13.9 Billion Profit Is Biggest Ever by British Company, supra note
450; see also Guy Chazan, Shell Warns on Output After Profit Gusher, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1,
For American gasoline consumers, multinationals significantly control the
supply chain with their refineries, distribution routes, and gas station
franchises, and often participate in domestic and foreign production.447  U.S.
gasoline prices were $1.50 per gallon in January 2003, $3.00 per gallon in
July 2006, and exceeded $4.00 per gallon in June 2008.448  With each new oil
price surge, there was a new surge in gas prices.449  The oil majors not only
became larger due to increased production costs, but also kept posting profits
that surpassed previous years’ records.450  In 2005, oil company executives
provided many explanations when they were called before Congress to testify
about potential gasoline price gouging.  James Mulva, CEO of Conoco
Phillips, stated:  “Today’s higher prices are a function of longer-term supply
and demand trends and lost energy production during the recent
hurricanes.”451  The New York Times remarked about Exxon Mobil’s
fortuitous rise to become the largest corporation in the world:  “The increase
occurred as oil prices rose to a record, swelling the company’s 2004 sales to
$298 billion—more than the gross domestic product of Norway.”452  Three
years later, Exxon Mobil “beat its own record for the highest profits ever
recorded by any company, with net income rising three percent to $40.6
billion, thanks to surging oil prices.”453  Across the Atlantic, January 2008
headlines read: “Shell smashed all-time British company profit records today,
posting 2007 earnings of $27.5 billion.”454
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Oct. 15, 2000; Nov. 18, 2000; Mar. 12, 2001.  See also FTC Consent Agreement Allows the
Merger of Chevron Corp. and Texaco Inc., Preserves Market Competition, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Sept. 7, 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/09/chevtex.shtm.  
456. See John Hayes et al., Market Definition in Crude Oil: Estimating the Effects of the
BP/ARCO Merger, 52 ANTITRUST BULL. 179 (2007) (discussing market issues involved with
the mergers); Exxon/Mobil Agree to Largest FTC Divestiture Ever in Order to Settle FTC
Antitrust Charges, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 30, 1999), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/11/
exxonmobil.shtm; Nancy Rivera Brooks & James F. Peltz, Critics Line Up Against Chevron-
Texaco Merger, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2000, http://articles.latimes.com/2000/Oct/17/news/mn-
37675; see also Complaint, In re Chevron Corp., No. C-4023 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept. 17,
2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/09/chevtexcmp.htm Complaint, In re British
Petroleum Co., No. C-3868 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Apr. 19, 1999), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/os/1999/04/981-0345.%20c3868%20british%20petroleum%20cmp.htm.
457. See supra notes 125-26.
458. See Stock Price of BP, MORNINGSTAR, http://quote.morningstar.com/Stock/s.aspx?t=
BP&culture=en-US&region=USA&r=278669& byrefresh=yes (follow the “10Y” hyperlink)
(last updated Sept. 29, 2010); Stock Price of Chevron Corporation, MORNINGSTAR,
http://quote.morningstar.com/Stock/s.aspx?t=CVX (follow the “10Y” hyperlink) (last updated
Sept. 29, 2010); Stock Price of ExxonMobil Corporation, MORNINGSTAR,  http://quote.morning
star.com/Stock/s.aspx?t=XOM (follow the “10Y” hyperlink) (last updated Sept. 29, 2010). 
459. See Lonnie K. Stevans & David N. Sessions, Speculation, Futures Prices, and U.S.
Real Price of Crude Oil (Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working Paper, July 2, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154686 (follow the “One-Click Download” hyperlink); Jon Birger,
Oil: Speculating on Higher Prices, CNNMONEY.COM, (Aug. 3, 2009, 11:32 AM), http://money.
cnn.com/2009/08/03/pf/oil_prices_rebound.fortune; Did Speculation Fuel Oil Price Swings?,
A related factor that might have bred commodity market uncertainty,
especially since it coincided with the first drastic price escalations during
1999, was information regarding anti-competitive supply chain relations with
the proposed mergers and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) investigations
and approvals of the BP Amoco (January 1999), Exxon Mobil (November
1999), and Chevron Texaco (September 2001) mergers.455  The mergers were
controversial, and involved divestitures, restructuring, and FTC complaints
that attempted to block the agreements.456  In effect, it was a further
consolidation of the “Seven Sisters.”457  Unsurprisingly, ten-year stock values
of all three of these companies tracked the high oil price trends with stock
prices appreciating by as much as 300 percent.458
C. “Speculation” Combined with Underlying Supply Uncertainty?
With numerous causal influences and no consensus as to what made traders
react to drive prices so high, in 2009 it was commonly reported that market
speculation was causing recent price surges.459  In July 2009, Nobel Laureate
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Speculation, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Aug. 27, 2009, 4:19 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.
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http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/08/oil-speculation/; Kilian, supra note 400 ("[T]here
is no evidence that [speculation] caused the surge in the real price of oil during 2003-06 and
only very limited evidence that it helps explain the 2007-08 oil price surge.").
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TEWELES ET AL., THE COMMODITY FUTURES GAME: WHO WINS? WHO LOSES? WHY? 11-14
(1974); Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56
FORDHAM L. REV. 345-47 (1987); Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b):
Security Prices and the Text of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
359, 364 (1988).
462. Price collusion has been a crime under U.S. federal law for over eighty years.   Future
Trading Act, Pub. L. No. 67-66, § 5(d), 42 Stat. 187, 188 (1921), amended by Pub. L. No. 74-
675, § 9, 49 Stat. 1491, 1499-1500 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 6 (2000)).
463. Kenneth Arrow, Futures Markets: Some Theoretical Perspectives, Summer 1981 J.
FUTURES MKTS. 107, 114; Charles C. Cox, Futures Trading and Market Information, 84 J. POL.
ECON. 1215, 1216-18 (1976).
464. U.N. ECON. & SOC. AFF., World Economic Situation and Prospects 2003 5-6 (2003),
available at http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp03-c1.pdf.
Paul Krugman wrote:  “[O]il inventories are bulging, with huge amounts held
in offshore tankers as well as in conventional storage.  So this time there’s no
question: speculation has been driving prices up.”460  “Gambling” on the
direction of prices in the futures commodity market may have been a culprit
contributing to the earlier price spikes.  Speculation has been periodically
fingered for causing “artificial” prices in markets for more than a century.461
However, because trading is assumed to be guided by unassociated self-
interest462 and by definition the futures market price is formed by aggregating
the varying expectations and information of all traders,463 it is probable that
sequential information generated future supply level uncertainty to foster
speculation conditions and drive sustained price increases to sevenfold higher
prices over six years.
The most astute forecast may have been provided in a January 2003 UN
World Economic Situation and Prospects report, which alerted that two of the
four great economic uncertainties and risks for the global economy were
“sustainability of the external deficits of the United States” and “military
action in [Iraq, which] might lead to a disruption in oil supplies, provoking
an oil-supply shock to the world economy exacerbating the effects of the
increase in oil prices in late 2002.”464  Similarly, in August 2002, Forbes
magazine wrote: “Where there’s a rumor of war, there’s nervousness in oil
markets.  It’s to be expected that the saber rattling coming out of the White
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television broadcast Apr. 25, 2004); see also BHC, Larry T. Marek, The Caspian Sea Pipeline:
A Clear Strategic U.S. Interest (June 30, 2007) (Research Paper, U.S. Army War College),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA471547&Location=U2&doc=
GetTRDoc.pdf. 
House about a possible invasion and change of regime in Iraq should have oil
traders debating how oil markets will react . . . But [for maintaining supply]
it’s important to keep in mind that OPEC members routinely cheat on their
outputs.”465  In September 2005, the IMF surmised that “fears of potential
supply disruption” were a major cause of price increases.466  Other scholars
directly cited the invasion of Iraq as the cause of oil price increases to varying
degrees.467
IX. Strategic Interests in Afghanistan
A. Coveted Pipelines
Public information involving Afghanistan may offer additional insight as
to whether military actions precipitate market uncertainty.  In an ABC
Nightline broadcast devoted to the subject of securing oil and gas pipelines
across Afghanistan, Ted Koppel opened by stating:
Sometimes, and this may be one of those times, the obvious—our
war against international terrorism—intersects with the not so
obvious, developing the last major untapped pool of oil and gas in
the world.  It’s not immediately evident and no one in the
administration is talking about it openly, but the war on terrorism
could produce major dividends for the United States . . . There are,
in the region, massive energy resources and the presence of
American military forces in Kyrgyzstan, for example, could
ultimately enhance the ability of U.S. companies to move that oil
and gas through previously inaccessible regions.468
A defining characteristic of the Cold War was that the “Seven Sister”
multinational oligopoly permitted the U.K. and United States to use “supply
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a pipeline); Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Oil, NEW YORKER, July 9, 2001, at 48; Risen,
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of oil” economic relationships as leverage to maintain countries within the
capitalist geopolitical orbit.  Russia, with its expansive energy resources, did
the same with Soviet bloc countries.469  With the Cold War over, Western oil
companies began investing billions of dollars in the mid-1990s and were even
granted rights to exploit by Caspian countries that were formerly under Soviet
influence.470  Capitalizing on investments would presumably require a means
of efficiently transporting resources from the landlocked region to global
markets.471  The chief candidates included a westerly route (generally across
the Balkans) and a southerly route (through Afghanistan), while geopolitics
with Russia and Iran made paths through these countries unlikely options.472
The U.S.-Soviet “proxy war” during the 1980s left Afghanistan with
battling regional factions and an impoverished population.473  Amid turmoil,
outside interests became consumed with the prospect of constructing pipelines
across Afghanistan.474  In 1998, a Taliban representative spoke at Columbia
University to a room filled with oil company representatives and explained:
“The people of Afghanistan are happier now that we have come.  We have
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Cato Institute Collateral Damage Conference (June 23, 1998), available at http://www.cato.org/
speeches/sp-dc062398.html; see also Nightline, supra note 468 (emphasizing Bush
administration appointee connections to oil industry and Cheney’s interest in the Caspian
region).
479. Dick Cheney, Speech at the London Institute of Petroleum Autumn Lunch (1999),
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20000414054656/www.petroleum.co.uk/speeches.htm;
see also Bill Moyers Journal: Moyers on Big Oil, supra note 217. 
brought stability and peace to the country.”475  The Taliban apparently could
not provide security to the proposed pipeline route, seemingly because it
lacked the military strength and popular support to exercise control across a
mountainous and poor country with decrepit infrastructure and regional
warlords vying for power and wealth by harvesting and trafficking in
opium.476
Developments kindled during the Clinton administration, and some
officials annexed assuring energy supply with national security.  Strategic
Assessment 1999, prepared for the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of
Staff, affirmed that access to energy resources would shape international
security, emphasized that up to two-thirds of the world’s oil and gas needs
“will come from the turbulent regions of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian
basin,” and even speculated that military force could be required if there was
a threat to supply.477  In a June 1998 CATO Institute speech entitled
Defending Liberty in a Global Economy, Halliburton CEO Richard Cheney
emphasized instability in oil rich regions and highlighted the suddenly-
emerging strategic significance and American business opportunities in the
Caspian.478  In fall 1999, Cheney spoke at the London Institute of Petroleum
and contended:  “[B]y 2010 we [the world] will need on the order of an
additional fifty million barrels a day.  So where is the oil going to come
from? . . . [T]he Middle East with two-thirds of the world’s oil and the lowest
cost, is still where the prize ultimately lies.”479  Cheney’s assessment was over
300 percent higher than actual consumption growth over this period, but if his
forecast was taken seriously, it could have provided signals to the market of
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fear of shortage and that the incoming administration would emphasize an
“energy security” foreign policy.
Within days of taking office, newly-elected Vice President Cheney created
and led an Energy Task Force (ETF) that espoused a mission to meld “the
review of operational policies towards rogue states” and design policies
“regarding the capture of new and existing oil and gas fields.”480  A May 2001
National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPO) report, entitled Reliable,
Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future, stated:
“By any estimation, Middle East oil producers will remain central to world
oil security.  The Gulf will be a primary focus of U.S. international energy
policy.”481  The report noted the importance of Caspian region oil and
recognized that “proven oil reserves in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are about
twenty billion barrels,”482 which would be valued at $1 trillion with a $50 per
barrel price.  These estimated oil reserves are insignificant in comparison to
proven Middle East reserves, but Turkmenistan is estimated to have the fifth
largest gas reserves.483  For multinationals, investments in the Caspian region
diversify global operations and provide potentially higher profit margins with
involvement in production and pipeline ownership.484  For global markets,
new production would provide another non-OPEC source of supply.485  The
NEPO report iterated dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the importance
of regional alliances, estimated that the United States would require
approximately fifty percent more imported oil over the next decade, and
warned that  “[a] significant disruption in world oil supplies could adversely
affect our economy and our ability to promote key foreign and economic
policy objectives.”486  Several other White House documents, memos, oil
production tables, and maps of Iraqi oil fields (with February and March 2001
dates) later surfaced.487  British reports also emphasized reliance on Middle
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Eastern oil, and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw’s “Strategic Priorities for
British Foreign Policy” speech in January 2003 noted that one critical priority
was “to bolster the security of British and global energy supplies.”488
B. Enron
During the late-1990s, Enron consummated contracts across South Asia,
courted Taliban officials to corporate meetings in Texas, and escorted them
to diplomatic meetings at the State Department.489  At the same time, Enron
unfurled a mission statement to become the world’s leading company, and
Fortune magazine identified it as one of “America’s Most Innovative
Companies.”490  During its high-profile insolvency and bankruptcy period,491
Enron became regarded as an excessively leveraged492 paper company,
without assets,493 but with an enigmatic financial structure494 that permitted
it to concoct fraudulent profitability accounting scenarios with affiliated shell
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companies.495  Engaging in a decade of risky investments across Asia did not
provide stability to its financial condition.
Enron’s regional interest in Asia began in November 1993 when it
contracted to build the Dabhol power plant in India.496  At the time, it was the
largest investment for both Enron and India at $2.9 billion and would give
Enron a 65% controlling interest in a facility expected to provide 20% of
India’s energy needs by 1997.497  By June 1998, the Dabhol power plant was
producing overpriced energy at only ten percent of originally-anticipated
capacity, and was mismanaged, plagued with corruption charges, going
bankrupt, and scheduled to shut down in June 2001.498  In summer 2001, the
Bush White House constituted a “Dabhol Working Group” to urge India to
continue funding the plant and keep it open.499  A congressional investigation
found that Enron’s plan was to service energy production by transporting
“liquified natural gas,” which made the operation “not economically
viable.”500  When the project operated, India, Enron, and other participating
regional governments might have presumed that sufficient natural gas would
be transported across Afghanistan.  In June 1996, while Dabhol was under
construction, Enron signed a $1.3 billion contract to exploit Uzbekistan’s
natural gas fields and the U.S. government authorized $400 million in funding
from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to support the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss2/1
2011] GEOPOLITICS, OIL LAW & COMMODITY MARKETS 271
501. See OPIC to Underwrite Uzbek Gas E&D, 94 OIL & GAS J. 35 (1996); Uzbekistan Has
Difficulties Finding Venues for Its Gas, ALEXANDER’S GAS & OIL CONNECTIONS (Oct. 12,
1998), http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc85031.htm. 
502. Pipelines toward Europe have been built.  See EIA, Chronology, supra note 373 (see
July 13, 2006); JOHNSON, supra note 76, at 173.  Additional routes are being considered.  See
Go-ahead For Balkan Oil Pipeline, BBC, Dec. 28, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/
4130271.stm; Balazs Koranyi, Gas Disputes May Spur Plans For Balkan Pipeline, REUTERS,
Jan. 25, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=UKLO45463120090125.  In 2007,
construction of a seven-thousand-kilometer natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China
began.  China President Opens Turkmenistan Gas Pipeline, BBC, Dec. 14, 2009, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8411204.stm.
503. See K. ALAN KRONSTADT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33529, INDIA-U.S. RELATIONS
1, 27 (2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/80669.pdf; ARIEL COHEN
ET AL., HERITAGE FOUND., THE PROPOSED IRAN-PAKISTAN-INDIA GAS PIPELINE: AN
UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO REGIONAL SECURITY (2008), available at http://www.heritage.org/
research/asiaandthepacific/bg2139.cfm. 
504. See U.N. Sec. Council, Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan
Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, S/2001/1154 (2001),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f48f4754.html; JAMES DOBBINS ET AL.,
AMERICA’S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING FROM GERMANY TO IRAQ 133 (2003); Karzai Declared
Elected President, BBC NEWS (Nov. 2, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8337
832.stm.
505. See Turkmen-Afghan-Pakistani Gas Pipeline Accord Published, ALEXANDER’S GAS &
OIL CONNECTIONS (June 27, 2002), http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/nts22622.htm;
Afghanistan Plans Gas Pipeline, BBC, May 13, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/
1984459.stm; 3 Nations Pushing For Afghan Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2002, at A8.
506. Former Defense Intelligence Agency Analyst Karen Kwiatkowski references a map of
military bases and remarks: “If you map the proposed pipeline route across Afghanistan and you
look at our bases, it matches perfectly.  Our bases are there to solve a problem that the Taliban
could not solve.  The Taliban couldn’t provide security in that part of Afghanistan.  Well that’s
where our bases are.  So, does that have to do with Osama bin Laden?  It has nothing to do with
Osama bin Laden.”  DVD: Hijacking Catastrophe: 9/11 Fear & Selling American Empire
(Media Education Foundation 2006).  In particular, see the interviews with Kwiatkowski and
Vandana Shiva.  See also Ramtanu Maitra, US Scatters Bases to Control Eurasia, ASIA TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2005, http:/www.atimes.com/atimes/central_Asia/GC30Ag01.html; Nagan & Hammer,
supra note 489, at 377 (noting that the war cost little but strategic value of “projected oil
pipeline” was great).
investment.501  Several Caspian pipeline deals have since emerged,502 but
India is still seeking additional natural gas resources.503
C. The Invasion of Afghanistan
After the invasion of Afghanistan, U.S.-appointed President Hamid Karzai
(reelected to a five-year term in November 2009)504 signed an agreement in
May 2002 with Turkmenistan and Pakistan to build the trans-Afghan gas
pipeline project,505 and the Pentagon located bases along the proposed
route.506  While the U.S. military seemed primed to ensure security to the
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proposed pipeline route, whether the original purpose of the invasion—to
fight al Qaeda-was accomplished remains debatable.
The September 14, 2001 congressional resolution authorized the President
to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the [September 11, 2001] terrorist attacks.”507  Pentagon news releases
chronicled the "hot pursuit" and escape of a convoy suspected to be carrying
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda members in hundreds of cars and trucks
across the country.508  On another occasion, militants were nearly surrounded
but were able to flee into Pakistan across unblocked mountain passes.509  An
unknown number of other militants were purportedly picked up by relief
planes in Konduz and flown safely into Pakistan.510  Enemy elusiveness began
to bedazzle the global media when vivid sketches surfaced of massive multi-
story cave complexes that no one could discover, yet insurgents supposedly
used to evade capture.511  Within six months, the Bush administration
allegedly lost interest in bin Laden,512 shifted attention to Iraq,513 and allocated
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519. See supra notes 115, 136, 371, 373.
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nearly $1 billion to the Pakistani military for the next five years to support the
mission of capturing bin Laden.514  The assignment of culpability for 9/11 that
“justified” the invasion of Afghanistan seemed to shift from a malicious man
to the allegiant group called al Qaeda, to the Taliban, and even to segments
of the Afghani population and regional warlords that might oppose
occupation,515 while sometimes placing innocent civilians at risk.516
There are parallels between the invasion of Iraq and the invasion of
Afghanistan.  They both involved addressing purported security threats and
possible post-invasion economic benefits by remaining in occupation.517  For
Afghanistan, it was an interest that might manifest into long-coveted pipeline
routes.518  If traders viewed this invasion and occupation information as either
a Pentagon focus on protecting global energy supply or an act of nationalist
self-interest, then it may have signaled to them a market uncertainty that
further fueled the rapid inflation of global oil prices.
X. Conclusion
There have been numerous explanations for the drastically higher oil prices
trends that prevailed during the period from 2002 to 2008.  This article offers
a detailed supply side explanation of how conflict and geopolitics may
generate commodity market uncertainty.  The five most dramatic price spikes
in the past forty years coincided with what were arguably the five most
turbulent Middle East events over that period—the OPEC embargo/standoff
during 1973, the 1979-80 Iranian hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq war during the
early-1980s, the 1991 invasion of Kuwait, and the 2003 invasion and
occupation of Iraq.519  The current increase coincided with the Pentagon’s first
full-scale deployment since the Vietnam War, to a region possessing two-
thirds of global oil reserves.  
A finance axiom is that information moves markets.520  If the news depicts
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521. See Rhea, supra note 26, at 609.
conditions that might cause supply shortfall or uncertainty, then naturally a
commodity becomes more valuable.  The following chart illustrates this by
imposing dominant global headlines on a graph of oil prices.
Three distinct trader perceptions may follow from this information: (1)
there is a lingering remnant of the realist-based “use of force” system to
garner energy supply, (2) OPEC’s supply system cohesion might be
disrupted, and (3) conflict could subvert short-run supply.
First, the United States currently uses one-fourth of global oil production
and imports sixty percent of that consumption.  With no WMD, no Iraqi
government ties to al Qaeda, an Iraqi public favoring democratization but
evidently opposed to occupation, and many top officials acknowledging that
oil was a motivation for the invasion of Iraq,521 and with the mission in
Afghanistan possibility being interpreted as a shift from capture of Osama bin
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Laden to protection of a proposed pipeline route, it is highly probable that
revelations feed market perceptions that there were other reasons for military
action or that U.S. military dominance was employed to control or secure
foreign resources.  Perceptions may be mutually reinforcing with “peak oil”
hypotheses and knowledge of historical British and American foreign policy
if future risk of shortage appears realistic.  After taking office in January
2001, President Bush's top appointed neoconservative officials were the
modern day equivalent of “hawks” and proponents of military hegemony.
They had blatantly advocated overthrowing the Iraqi government for five
years prior to the 2003 invasion, but emphasized altruistic intentions, which
included protecting global oil supply and wielding a prominent U.S. military
role in the Middle East.
Second, U.S. officials openly condemned OPEC, referred to it as an “evil
cartel,” and wanted to “break it up” even though OPEC was producing at
record levels and trader market reactions drove high prices.522  There were
projections that Iraqi oil production—at approximately 2.5 million barrels per
day—was only one-third of potential production, with the OEWG even
providing a one-ninth estimate.  Current production is only seven percent of
OPEC’s total but expanding production threefold would move the production
range to twenty percent,523 cutting into a higher percentage of supply and
presumably pulling Iraq out of OPEC and quota negotiations.  Remaining
member countries could be left with revenue shortfalls and public account
disruptions that might inspire two extreme reactions—members could either
fend for themselves at the current price or band together to drastically drop
exports.  Such effects are usually not immediate, but uncertainty is the basis
of the futures market.
Third, reports of violence in Iraq signaled potential production disruptions.
Those conditions did not exist before the invasion.  During the occupation-
protected governmental restructuring, White House/CPA dictates were
imposed on a relatively closed and socialized economy and the media
reported that reforms would overwhelmingly benefit U.S. corporations.524
Adopting market-oriented legislative structures may be rational and advisable
in the end, but these reforms were excessive “shock treatment,” neither
gradual nor stable, and it appeared as if institutions to protect foreign oil
investors’ property rights were being locked in even before there was an
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elected Iraqi government.  Imposed rules were consistent with White House
and Iraqi exile pre-invasion planning proposals, despite questionable public
acceptance of the rules and even drastic repudiation.
Against this backdrop of reform, and after there was an elected Iraqi
government, new oil law proposals endeavoring to stimulate foreign
investment were fiercely resisted as “exploitive.”  Without a new federal oil
law and in light of constitutional controversies over sub-national assertions
of authority and the legal status of the federal government’s PSAs with
foreign investors during 2008 and 2009, market uncertainty still remains.  The
allegation that Iraq “requires” large-scale multinational capital infusion, when
OPEC countries have had nationalized industries for decades and are awash
in reinvestment revenues to increase production, is extremely controversial.
Regarding the viability of an ICJ/WTO claim against OPEC, it is assuredly
possible for OPEC to exploit a situation that might result in higher global and
artificial prices, but the facts indicate that this did not happen, and so did not
cause the recent soaring prices.  With such low and stable prices prevailing
from the mid-1980s until 1999, it is not clear that OPEC’s behavior has been
unreasonably opportunistic for the past thirty years.  As for American
politicians transfixed on expedient explanations for American economic
downturns and high oil and gasoline prices, they should search for answers
beyond OPEC heuristics.  The potential to obscure clear vision might even be
higher with the $393 million spent by the U.S. oil industry on lobbying and
campaign contributions during the Bush administration's tenure.525  Politicians
should focus on legislation that merges policies that reduce demand, improve
energy efficiency, and support environmental protection.  As Thomas
Friedman notes, the fact that the United States must alter its energy
consumption patterns to reduce the price of oil is “no longer a hobby for high-
minded environmentalists or some personal virtue.  It is now a national
security imperative.”526  If consumption reduces due to technological
progress, then demand and global market prices drop ceteris paribus.  So, too,
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should the “national security” anxiety, articulated by some as manifesting into
a post-Cold War Pentagon mission to “protect” global oil supply, dissipate.
The argument that global military hegemony breeds stability—including for
markets—out of what would otherwise be chaos, lacks substantial foundation.
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